



CYBERROAD

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CYBERCRIME AND CYBER-TERRORISM RESEARCH ROADMAP

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D₅.1 Stakeholder needs and threats evaluation

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Summary:

The viewpoint of the stakeholder provides the focal point from which the current cybercrime landscape is observed. By proactive means of observation and assessment the possible directions for the future conduct of research and development into appropriate solutions for cybercrime is explored. Crucial to these objectives is to understand what is meant by the terminology across the current landscape. Cybercrime and threats have a variety of meanings and connotations which affect attitudes, perceptions and actions. In exploring these issues from the stakeholders' perspective the aim is to highlight the need for a cohesive approach to finding solutions that are appropriate for the threats of the future. This approach brings together the views of the different stakeholders and challenges whether current solutions to cybercrime are fit-for-purpose, starting at the ground level. Without this knowledge it is not possible to know if the right course of actions are being followed. Key to understanding these topics is the ability to apply appropriate and standardised metrics such as benchmarking and best practices so that progress can be assessed and measured. Having these basic elements in place and appropriately available are crucial factors in ensuring return on investment (ROI) that is befitting the sums being spent. This study explores these topics using comparative analysis and surveys in order to unearth the current gaps so that future money is spent on productive areas of research rather than outdated or ineffectual resources.

Keywords:

Cybercrime, metrics, taxonomy, threats, measurement, survey, stakeholders, scenario, roadmap, definition, technology, privacy, cyber security, EU, Poland, intrusions, statistics, evidence-based practices



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1 Introduction

The objective of D_{5.1} is to assess the needs of stakeholders and the threats that they are facing from cybercrime. A survey explores the current security landscape of existing EU-related threats, to provide high and low-level views of the issues and of the delivery *modus operandi* of the threats. Threats may be real or perceived; the aim is to observe stakeholders viewpoints both quantitatively and qualitatively as a topic of interest. Assessment of the stakeholders and their needs is a vital focus which is undertaken using innovative techniques to facilitate enquiry of the important questions for this task and for the rest of the work package, for example:

- a) What are the key interests/concerns of each stakeholder group?
- b) What does each stakeholder want/need?
- c) Can these needs be realistically met?
- d) Who will be affected?
- e) Who/how will the findings be implemented?

The current threat situation is a product of its historic evolution. This deliverable looks at the effect on the stakeholder and any existing gaps in terms of practices currently employed and what is needed for the future if solutions to cyberrime are to become a reality.

Key to this investigation is an exploration of innovative ways in which stakeholders can be engaged across the industry so that all the sectors affected by cybercrime are represented fairly and without bias. The needs of stakeholders in the light of technological, social, legal, ethical, political, and economic trends all have a bearing on preparedness of individuals and organisations for the future. The CyberROAD surveys explore these issues through in-depth analysis and it is expected that this approach will shed light on prevalent research gaps which will form a major contribution to the CyberROAD roadmap for the future.

For this deliverable, therefore, two vital lines of enquiry around stakeholders are needed: i) assessing the current threat status, and ii) assessing the needs both now and into the future. These two areas provide the focus for this body of work from which the outcomes will provide a major contribution towards the generation of research gaps in **D5.6 Cybercrime Research Topics**. The body of work contained within this deliverable will, therefore, provide essential research and contribute towards the lasting legacy of the CyberROAD project.



2 IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDER NEEDS & THREATS

The role of stakeholders in relation to cybercrime and security is a topic debated by organisations with an interest in internet governance and multi-stakeholder perspectives which may differ from the views of technical experts and politicians (Lee, 2014). Stakeholders, who they are and how best to define them, remains an area for exploration which D_{5.1} approaches using innovation techniques that explore the multi-stakeholder model.

An initial approach to these ideas and strategies were outlined in WP2, in D2.1 (Section 4.4.2 'A Proposal for the CyberROAD Roadmapping Methodology' Phase 1: Roadmap preparation). In D5.1 this methodology is applied as an investigative process and as a means of rationalizing stakeholder needs and threats identification. The 'Evidence-Based Practices' (EBP) model is used extensively in other fields and industries and provides a good analogy for the study of cybercrime.

The theory behind EBP can be traced back to "one of the fathers of epidemiology", John Snow (Wikipedia, 2015), whose work in 1849, traced the origin of an outbreak of cholera to a single water pump, began a seismic shift towards observational and 'evidence-based practices' in preventative health-care and to the development of epidemiology as a study.

Epidemiology can bring valuable precepts to the study of cybercrime and can be paralleled in several ways:

- Epidemiology studies and evaluates the patterns that occur in different groups.
- > Data collection and interpretation are key areas of study along with measurement of outcomes in order to assess risk.
- ➤ A target population or study sample are subjects of evaluation although this can be problematic depending on sample size and method of selection and depend upon subjective or informed judgement.
- Decisions arising from epidemiology relate primarily to groups and not individuals. (BMJ, 2015)

The potential for correlation between epidemiology EBP and cybercrime is **an area of exploration** in D_{5.1} as a potential and innovative method of categorizing sources of evidences from different stakeholders and as a novel way of exploring possible contenders for inclusion in the research gaps analysis.

To further this purpose in terms of D_{5.1} two distinct processes were designed:

- 1) A searchable knowledge bank (known as 'The Database') of literature, papers, books, articles, journals, publically available government publications, reports, legal documents, case driven studies, etc., from various sources.
- 2) An in-depth survey of stakeholders in order to assess their needs now and into the future.

Throughout these processes the 'CyberROAD EBP Triad' is used to categorise the sources of evidence as, in following the epidemiological approach, evidence is best observed from a sample, group or category. Evidences in 'The Database' are fairly straightforward to categorize according to the three evidence-based groups (Artistotelian, Galilean, and Phenomenalist) but more problematic for evidences (survey results) from the stakeholders.



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The solution decided upon was to design a survey question where stakeholders (respondents) were asked to select the occupation group that most appropriately fitted to their own occupation. It was not known if this type of controlled grouping would work for the survey but it could provide an avenue for further exploration of categorization of sources according to 'EBP'. The usefulness would be in the ability to assess how balanced or representative the sources are in relation to the 'EBP Triad'. This is an area recommended for escalation to D₅.6 and for the roadmap of research gaps.

2.1 THE CYBERROAD TRIAD OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE

The 'CyberROAD Evidence-Based Triad' is outlined as a directional basis for this project in D_{2.1}. For D_{5.1} the 3 main categories of evidence-based sources; scientific evidence (Galilean), observatory based and event-driven case study experience (Phenomenalist), and consumer, political and commercial preferences (Aristotelian) are explored as a means to rationalize sources of evidences. To fit the purpose of this deliverable, the 'CyberROAD Triad' was adapted as represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1 'The CyberROAD Triad of Evidence-Based Practice (EBP)

The approach is explained more fully in the following sections.

2.1.1 GALILEAN EBP CATEGORY

This category contains groups that contribute to knowledge on (or about) cybersecurity from a quantitative and/or research perspective, mainly guided by scientific theoretical background. Evidences from this category include international organisations e.g. Council of Europe, research



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entities e.g. Ponemon Institute, educational institutions, 'think tanks' e.g. East West Institute, standard-setting bodies e.g. International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), governments, etc.

2.1.2 PHENOMENOLIST EBP CATEGORY

This category contains groups that contribute to knowledge on or about cybersecurity from a practitioners' or expert knowledge point of view. Evidences from this category include corporates and other entities that provide metrics and information on cybersecurity issues, such as Kaspersky Labs, McAfee, Trustwave, IBM (International Business Machines Corporation), etc., non-profits sharing metrics and expert knowledge such as Anti-Phishing Working Group, ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security), HostExploit, CERTs (Computer Emergency Readiness Team), service providers such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), etc.

2.1.3 ARISTOTELIAN EBP CATEGORY

This category contains groups that do not apply the experimental scientific method, but mostly rely on intuition, pure reasoning and humanistic themes. Evidences from this category include for profit and non-profit organisations that represent the interests of consumers, end-users, businesses and humanist issues such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), reporting entities, e.g. The Economist, regulators (government-approved or independent) e.g. The Office of Communications (OFCOM), Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), etc.

2.2 STAKEHOLDER NEEDS & CONCERNS

2.2.1 CYBERCRIME - WHAT IS IT?

Defining 'what is cybercrime' is an important focus of this deliverable and an area that is explored in detail in the D_{5.1} surveys. Currently a variety of definitions on cybercrime exist: this presents an acute problem for accurate study of the whole domain. For example, how can 'cybercrime' be measured or costed when cybercrime is interpreted differently by individual groups, organisations, governments, citizens, etc. The problems associated with the costing of cybercrime is discussed more fully in D_{3.1} Social, Economic, Political and Legal Landscape Report, Section 3 Socioeconomic Lens of Cybercrime) and in this deliverable in Section 4.1.1 The Economics of Privacy.

Since its inception in 2001 the Council of Europe's **Budapest Convention on Cybercrime¹** remains the only internationally ratified treaty. It is signed by a number of countries worldwide (55 ratifications and 8 signatures as 18.05.15). The 'Budapest Convention' serves to align international legislation and improve cooperation across borders by providing definitions of the types of activities recommended for criminalisation in the national law of member states, and guidance on procedures that member states are recommended to follow, for example, enabling law enforcement to gather appropriate evidences from service providers. 'Additional Protocols' are added when needed, for example, cyber terrorism activities as defined and entered on 1 March 2006 (Council of Europe, n.d.). A major criticism levied against the Convention, from some countries not signed up to the treaty, is that it violates a country's own sovereign law.

¹ http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm



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The difficulty in accommodating all the different stakeholder needs into a definitive statement, in terms of the objectives of the CyberROAD project, is discussed in **D2.1 Section 3 Cyber Security: Definitions and the Problem Space**. Here, cybercrime is defined as:

Cybercrime encompasses two forms of criminal activities: the use of computer systems to enable traditional forms of criminal activity (e.g., child pornography, money laundering); and the use of a computer system to launch a cyber attack (as understood by the aforementioned definition).

This description was arrived at by the CyberROAD team from an amalgamation of common conceptual distinctions found in many laws, academic articles or government reports, i.e., the Budapest Convention, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013). The latter document provides a reasoned argument of the need for a 'core' description of cybercrime while emphasising the point that an 'aggregate' concept may not befit 'the art' (Chapter 1: Connectivity and Cybercrime, pgs 1-22). The description arrived at in D2.1 was for illustratative and guidance purposes only and was further qualified by stating that definitions would be amended accordingly as the project progressed.

From D₅.1's viewpoint the emphasis is on the definition of cybercrime from the perspective of the different stakeholders and research gaps that may result from diverse perceptions, opinions and quantitative and qualitative sources. Definition is an area for survey analysis with more detail provided in <u>Section 3</u> and <u>Annexes A-E</u>. It is anticipated that if major differences in stakeholder definition are exposed in the surveys these will be escalated to **D₅.6 Cybercrime Research Topics** for further research gap analysis.

2.2.2 CYBERCRIME – THE PAST

The current landscape is shaped by its historical evolution which, for cybercrime, occurred over a relatively short time span. Rapid technological development and systems designed without security in mind (McGraw, et al., 2000) have enabled opportunistic cybercriminals to gain advantage over less 'savvy' entities. Worryingly, latest research from some quarters suggest that this situation continues into the technologies of the future, for example, application security firm Veracode found that Internet of Things (IOT) devices have "serious issues..." (Constantin, 2015).

As computerised communications spread among elite groups in the 1970s unlawful actions tended to be confined mainly to violations of privacy. Attackers then had no deliberate intention of causing harm to a victim but plied their activities as a platform for demonstration,: hackers used system intrusions and attacks as a way of testing themselves and to showcase their skills (Armin & Foti, 2015).

As the industry matured the advent of the Internet enabled communications on a global scale and facilitated a new breed of opportunistic 'cyber' criminal with the skills and ability to exploit flaws in the rapidly developed technologies. Users lacking the same level of knowledge and awareness of this new type of activity became easy victims. Cybercrime had arrived and with it a successful business model with excellent returns on investment (ROI). Data quickly became the new highly valued commodity which could be exploited via weaknesses in both the technology and its users.

Today, newer and more powerful technology further enhances the ability to launch, for example, bigger DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks across a wide range of industry types. Akamai Technologies, Inc observed almost a 90 percent increase in DDoS attacks in Q4 of 2014 compared to



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Q4 in 2013 (Akamai Technologies, Inc, 2015). Correlation between the increase in DDoS attack traffic and unlawful intrusion attempts is illustrated in Figure 2 (CyberDefcon, 2015).




Figure 2: Intrusion Attempts vs Peak Attack Traffic 2006 - 2015

Despite the array of solutions on the market: anti-virus, firewalls, data encryption, spam blockers, etc., cybercriminal incidents continue to rise.

2.2.3 CYBERCRIME – IMPACTS AND EFFECTS

The effects and impacts of cybercrime is investigated via the stakeholder survey. These may be actual or perceived depending on the view point of the stakeholder. As well, the extent of any effect is bound up with an individual interpetation of what constitutes a cybercriminal action. The effect and impact may differ depending whether the target (perceived or real) is an individual or group/organization as may any following actions.

An act that is perceived as cybercrime by one entity may not be perceived in the same way by another and is, therefore, a subjective or intangible entity. 'Loss of reputation' is an example of such an effect and a domain that is difficult to quantify. There have been attempts to rationalize such costs within a framework for costing. Examples include, 'External consequences and costs' (Ponemon Institute, 2014), 'damage to balance sheets' (Ponemon Institute for Accenture, 2009) and 'indirect cost' (Anderson, et al., 2013) but these include different details and employ different methodologies. These labels are directed towards business costs; impacts and consequences on individuals requires a different approach. Until an effective method of measuring intangible effects is achieved there will be wide variations in any attempt to quantify the effects, consequences and costs in this area.

A regular survey on EU citizens' 'experiences and perceptions of cyber security issues' is requested by The European Commission, 'The Special Eurobarometer 423 Cyber Security' (TNS Opinion & Social (requested by EU Commission), 2015). The latest survey conducted in October 2014 showed that, since the previous study in 2013, concern about cybercrime had increased. The CyberROAD surveys explore this area and comparisons will be useful in highlighting domains of concern.



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2.2.4 CYBERCRIME - THE FUTURE

To arrive at any tangible solutions for the future, the present has to be observed and comprehended. That requires an ability to define and measure what is the current state and to project how this knowledge can be applied to the future. This is a topic that is explored throughout this deliverable using quantifiable and qualitative means to give an accurate picture of where we are, the gaps that exist in the knowledge, and how this can be resolved for the future.

Today, cybercrime is already multi-dimensional and with it sophisticated self-sufficient digital under and over ground economies have emerged, which uses data as an illicit commodity. It targets citizens, businesses and governments to obtain data, typically for financial gain. The cybercrime rate continues to increase in line with Internet adoption, mobile Internet access and deployment of broadband Internet, far too quickly for conventional law enforcement methods and particular initiatives to stop it (Global Economic Symposium, 2015) (Jeffray, 2014).

In this scenario, accurate trends and predictions for cybercrime attacks are severely difficult to draw for a distant future. However, some challenges may be pointed out that allow to deliver tangible solutions, when considering instead a near future (2-3 years) (Jeffray, 2014) (SysSec, 2013).

Thus, more than ever before, collaboration is a matter of utmost importance for any successful strategy to achieve the common goal of fighting cybercrime. Combined, well-coordinated and active partnerships of law enforcement, governments, academic sector, ICT industry, ICT security services, online financial services, etc., are necessary to leverage existing resources more effectively and timely, even acknowledging the fact that this cooperation between public and private sectors is by itself a challenge (SysSec, 2013).

A "mesh network" has to emerge from such a variety of stakeholders, to produce specific intelligence that should not only provide more accurate and comprehensive assessment of cyber criminality, but also to ensure that the responses are effective and prompt, especially when new clear threats and problems arise. 'The Third Platform Innovation Stage' (IDC, 2014) describes the anticipated explosion of new technologies and innovation predicted to arrive on the open market over the next few years. The main features of the expanding attack surface can be summed up as follows:

- As social media sites go mobile, payment mechanisms become more common, tablets and smartphones continue to penetrate the market, exploitation of specific vulnerabilities in these services and devices as well as advance of mobile malware become inevitable.
- ➤ The rise of the Internet of Things and expected boom of connected technologies as well as consumer-grade cloud services, where public and private assets are stored electronically rather than physically, will undoubtedly provide other opportunities for cybercriminals and raise additional problems for the security industry.

So, through collaboration, it is possible to make a few reliable and practical predictions on how the industry will shift over the next couple of years, pointing out the new threats and concerns, some key ones summarized in the previous paragraph. However, the challenges will be based on how this collaboration builds the intelligence capable to respond to the challenges posed by the following questions:

- How can the users control their data (for example, the process of their removal deletion)?
- How can we enable users to have private communication in a public space?

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How shall we design compromise-tolerant systems to provide levels of liability, even if some of their components are compromised, enabling resilient services and solutions to exist?

These questions may, to some degree, be already partially fulfilled but full collaboration requires greater levels of transparency than currently exists. Transparency in the competitive environment of innovative technology is fiercely resisted by some quarters. For others it potentially means allowing access to state secrets or the ability to carry out unhindered surveillance. Communication in public spaces and privacy rights can be contentious issues and country specific. An important factor to consider is how greater integration of critical services to the digital world can be achieved without intolerable risk and fear for service users. Consideration of future impacts and effects in areas such as these would help to identify the technological gaps and address necessary research directions.



D2.1 (Section 4.2.4 Data Sources, and Information Collection and Processing) outlines the various techniques utilised to elicit knowledge. For the purpose of **D5.1** the Delphi method was chosen as the most appropriate approach for the survey component of the tasks. The Delphi methodology is particularly suited to forecasting trends in the future [Kanama 2013] and provides a **rational** approach to the collection of viewpoints and opinions. This is especially useful for **D5.1** as respondent participatation in further rounds of questionnaires gives the opportunity to investigate further on select questions. However, due to the time constraints within **D5.1**, it would be necessary to limit the number of survey rounds to an initial questionnaire, to begin the participation process and gauge interest in further rounds, followed by a second final round with the option of two surveys, each dedicated to a specialist area.

3.1 THE SURVEY -A DELPHI APPROACH

For D_{5.1} a broad-based Delphi approach² survey was designed by project partners with the aim of gaining an understanding of the impact of cybercrime on stakeholders and to use results to compare against other current research. This approach consists of an initial poll followed by two further surveys where participants of the first round are invited to complete at least one, or possibly two, subsequent polls (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Participation is voluntary and further rounds of the survey are only distributed to participants who express an interest in contributing at the next stage. Answers from the first survey are used to generate more specific questions in the following rounds.

3.1.1 SURVEY AIM

The purpose of the CyberROAD survey is to explore and establish the needs of stakeholders and to find out what they see as the potential threats both now and into the future. As perceived threats may be different from real threats, it is important to try to correlate stakeholders' experiences of cybercrime with the situation as reflected in current reports and analyses. A mismatch between the two can be costly in terms of money spent on research and to stakeholders' understanding of what should or could be done to alleviate risk, i.e., are the right threats being targeted at present?, Can a blanket approach to security be taken or would a more flexible system be of more benefit?

3.1.2 SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Survey 1 was prepared using specialist online software and designed along the lines of the Delphi method. The questions for this survey were of a generic nature as the intention was for Surveys 2 & 3 to explore resultant themes at a deeper level. To exploit the CyberROAD Cybercrime Survey a number of distribution methods were employed by project partners. These included the project website, a dedicated website³, announcements via social media (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), and prompting by email to interested parties.

For the purposes of the CyberROAD project it was decided that the greatest value would be obtained from a comparative study using participants worldwide but with a bias towards European citizens. Using the Delphi method for the surveys made it possible to drawdown in order to probe further using selective criteria, if required. For a European project, it made sense to compare the region with others at a macro level i.e., world, and also at a micro level i.e., a specific country: Poland. Poland was selected

³ http://cyberroad.eu/



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² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delphi_method

because it is one of the larger EU countries and is also represented by a national CERT team (CERT Polska) in the CyberROAD consortium. The participation of a national CERT allowed for easier access to various statistics on the threats affecting Poland and good potential outreach to other entities in the country as well as the general public which is especially important when disseminating surveys. The CyberROAD team decided that the surveys should be split into two versions: one for English speakers worldwide and the other translated into Polish and aimed at Polish users.

3.1.3 TARGET GROUPS

In Section 2.1, the 'CyberROAD Triad of Evidence-Based Practices' is outlined as applies to this deliverable. The model is used to example how epidemiological methods may be useful in cybercrime research areas. Respondent surveys are analysed individually and collectively according to occupation type or evidence source to introduce an element of innovation to observations.

Achieving a balanced representation across evidence source types is the ideal and it is hoped that with the varied outreach of CyberROAD partners this will be achieved. However, it is expected that interest in the surveys is most likely to be greatest from those already involved in the cyber security industry. Over representation of evidences presented from one or more sources may produce bias in the results.



To understand the current security landscape a wide range of topics need to be considered. The scale and effects of the modern phenomenon of cybercrime raises questions which has few, if any, precedents. Cybercrime is experienced around the world with few international agreements in place that adequately tackle the issues. Terminology, standards and practices are slow to mature and hinder progress towards cross-border compliance. Much of the difficulty stems from not knowing the extent of the problem which, in purely economic terms, affects budgets and forecasting from governments, to boards and to the end-user. Not knowing how big the problem is, is not exclusive to cybercrime but the industry's rapid global development has outpaced the ability to reach consensus on even rudimentary definitions. In terms of technology, and the need to take competitive advantage, the fast-paced development of concepts has been at the expense of security with the industry in a constant state of 'catch-up' with the cybercriminal.

Here, this dilemma is reviewed with views from a macro level (global) to micro level (Poland) through observations of the current security and threat landscape. The rationale for selecting Poland is explained in Section 3.1.2. Survey Methodology. To review the whole security landscape is beyond the remit of the CyberROAD project but instead a snapshot of select areas is presented for observational purposes. This facilitates analysis of key areas which are further analysed via the CyberROAD surveys.

Wherever appropriate, the 'CyberROAD Triad of EBP' is used to exemplify how innovative but practical approaches can be applied to this area.

4.1 THE STATE OF THE ART – A MACRO PERSPECTIVE

There is no shortage of information to be found on any number of topics associated with cyber security. Taking the example of 'the cost of cybercrime', within the last 5 years there are 3,920 web searchable scholarly articles, papers and books on this subject alone⁴. Added to this is the wide spectrum of commercial sources collecting, collating and disseminating related information and data, some of which is not publically accessible.

The value and accuracy of the information provided in this domain is an area worthy of further research. However, an in-depth comparative study of all relevant reports is outside the remit of the CyberROAD project. Instead a sample of typical studies and reports provide the evidences for the purpose of research gap analysis. This was 'macro to micro' approach is a theme of this deliveable.

A review of a representative sample of five major studies on the theme of the "cost of cybercrime" together and one quantitative study with a focus on a specific attack type was undertaken for D_{3.1} (Section 3.2 Review of the State of the Art of Metrics). These are not reviewed again here although observations from these reports will contribute to the overall analysis within this section. An additional study specifically explored the issue of the cost of privacy, the related cost of identity theft and data breaches relating to personal data. A review is presented here as a example of how this type of examination can provide valuable evidences for further study.

⁴ Google web browser search on 13.02.15



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4.1.1 THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY (ACQUISTI ET AL. 2015)

'The Economics of Privacy' study (Acquisti, et al., 2015) provides an updated survey on the economics of privacy. The main focus is not on the abuse of personal data stored on computers, nor on data breaches, but on the value that can be attached to private data.

As soon as people consent to the use of their data for marketing purposes, than the value of the data can be associated to the gain that the user may acquire in terms of discounts or other privileges in their purchasing activities. The value of the data is quite different if measured at the subject's premises (small value), and at the marketing company's premises (high value).

Then, in the case of cybercrime, which value is to be associated with stolen/misused data? In the absence of crime this is made all the more difficult to compute.

This study clearly points out the three factors affecting the value of private data stored and shared over the Internet: individual responsibility, market competition, and government regulation. Individual responsibility requires awareness of the benefits and risks that sharing data brings in itself. Market competition exists to the extent to which to a value can be attached to this data. Finally, governments can regulate this market as it happens in other sectors.

At present, this topic is addressed in different ways in the EU and the US. While EU is steering towards government regulation on the management of private data, the US is drawing a framework that would allow different sectors to self-regulate this market. While estimates of the value of data breaches are available, e.g., the reports produced by the Ponemon Institute (Ponemon Institute, 2014), Verizon (Verizon, 2015), it is worth pointing out that the values tend to be in a quite wide range in the absence of market regulation rules.

The problems associated with computing appropriate values in costing data breaches is highlighted in a recent online article, 'The hotly disputed black magic of data breach cost estimates' (Hackett, 2015). Verizon's newly published report '2015 DBIR' (Data Breach Investigation Report) (Verizon, 2015) concludes with vastly different costing sums compared to Ponemon's reports. According to the article the cost-per-recoed unit number for Ponemone is 'roughly \$200' while for Verizon it is \$0.58 .The explanation for such a variation is attributed to the different data collection and computation methodologies used for each report. The authors of the Verizon report conclude that neither model is faultless.

4.1.2 STATISTICS AND METRICS

Statistics or metrics is a vitally important domain in the study of cybercrime. Asssurance in the quality and origin of the data reinforces dissemination. A reliable source is a fundamental of trusted metrics. However, in an industry where few standards exist knowing what constitutes reliable information can be problematic. Measurement is key to seeking out solutions as the extent of the problem requires accurate assessment. No reliable method of costing cybercrime exists but basic statistics what can be measured with some certainty lays a foundation for further progress.

To give an overview of the current security landscape a select sample of available metrics are represented here. Costing cybercrime has no standard model but it is possible to outline cybercrime activity through a number of indicators. For example;

➤ There were over 1 million+ measurable cyber-attacks counted in October 2014 (Akamai, 2014)



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- > 7% of all URLs malicious (Barracuda, 2015)
- There is over 350 million+ in total identifiable malware (AV-TEST, 2015)
- > 85% of processed emails are spam (Barracuda, 2015)

The above metrics give a snapshot indication of the levels of cybercriminal activities at any one time. Cybercriminal activity is variable and the same results may not be achievable on any given day. When applying metrics to cybercrime this variablity in activity requires consideration.

Reliable and quantifiable data is a cornerstone for measurement and a topic requiring further research. The problem in achieving an agreed base unit cost per cybercrime is highlighted in <u>Section 4.1.1</u> above. The methodologies employed in achieving costing for insurance purposes or those for measuring the extent of a problem are most likely to be different with variables on either side. Questions that remain to be solved include, what is trusted data, and what data is pertinent?

4.2 POLAND – A MICRO PERSPECTIVE

There are few technical or academic articles that deal with the subject of cybercrime in Poland. The academic papers written in Polish or by Polish authors that exist on the topic tend to focus on the relevant laws that can be applied to cases that involve cybercrime, however, they do not provide any context or analysis of actual cases that have been handled and bottlenecks they experienced (an example list can be found in (Cybercrime Research Centre, n.d.). Non-security vendor driven research on the other hand tends to focus on compliance with EU regulation, usually in the broader cybersecurity context (a list of such research is presented below).

Foreign, often vendor driven, research on the other hand tends to focus on technical observations (for example, malware infection levels in the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (Microsoft Corp, 2014)) or makes assumptions on the level of cybercrime losses (i.e. cost of cybercrime) in the country as a whole (Norton, 2012). Especially in the latter case it is very unclear how accurate this is (which is not just an issue that applies only to Poland) (Greenberg, 2012).

4.2.1 CERT STATISTICS

CERT Polska, operating as part of the NASK Institute (Naukowa i Akademicka Sieć Komputerowa, a CyberROAD project partner) provides a broad number of security statistics based on actual observation of security incidents in Poland in its annual 2014 report (CERT Polska, 2014). For instance, it estimates that on an average day in 2014, there were 280 000 computers that had some form of malicious bot. Over 50 000 of these were infected with a type of banking Trojan - crimeware specifically written to facilitate financial fraud.

As part of its mission, CERT Polska regularly publishes information on specific mechanics of cybercrime, including a lot of statistics regarding malware on Polish networks, malicious URLs, phishing, spam, DDoS and Command & Control elements etc. A full list of publications is available (CERT Polska, n.d.).

Other similar reports, specifically focused on government administration in Poland, are published by the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW), which operates the CERT.GOV.PL (CERT.gov.pl, n.d.). Other Polish entities exist that publish cybercrime related statistics but from an Internet safety aspect (such as child safety online, child pornography and hate material); the saferinternet.pl programme (Polish Safer Internet Centre, n.d.), dyżurnet.pl (Dyzurnet, n.d.) and Fundacja Dzieci Niczyje (Fundacja Dzieci Niczyje, n.d.), are good examples.



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4.2.2 POLICE & GOVERNMENT STATISTICS

The Polish Police does not provide detailed statistics relating to cybercrime in their public reports (Polish Police, n.d.). More information can be gleaned from the MSW (Ministry of the Interior) reports (Polish Ministry of the Interior, n.d.) that include general statistics in terms of the amount of cases and (selected) laws applied. This also includes data from other parties, such as the Ministry of Justice. The Polish Ministry of the Interior Report lists 19 articles of the penal code that specifically concern cybercrime and attacks against computer systems - it lists another 19 that can also be committed in cyberspace. It also enumerates 11 different crimes understood as cybercrime:

- Online fraud
- 2. Phishing and other financial crime
- 3. Pedophilia and child pornography
- 4. Copyright and intellectual property infringement
- 5. Trading in unlicensed or illegal goods
- 6. Human and human organ trafficking
- 7. Illicit trade in excise goods
- 8. Trade in artifacts coming from crime and illegal trade of goods of national heritage
- 9. Extortion or threats by organized crime
- 10. Hacking, sniffing, breaking into systems and malware
- 11. Illegal gambling online

The MSW report also summarizes Police statistics regarding specific violations of articles of the penal code. However, apart from the fact that there is an increase in these selected violations, numbers are mostly either single to triple digit at most, it is not always clear if they concern cybercrime, as in the statistical system used by the Police in 2013 it is not obligatory to clearly state if a crime was committed on a computer network or the Internet.

For those that can be attributed to cybercrime, as understood by the MSW report, the only large number of offenses were "computer fraud" (26 945 cases) and "pedophilia and child pornography" (1648 cases). In terms of cybercrime cases that actually ended up in court, the numbers are just in the single or double digits. The top 2 categories: 57 persons tried (47 sentenced) concerned "computer fraud", and 33 persons tried (18 sentenced) concerned destruction or damage of computer data. The only two other categories in the report "interference in the functioning of computers or networks" and "production, acquisition, selling, sharing, devices or computer programs to commit crimes" were 9 (5) and 6 (4) respectively.

As part of the CyberROAD we have submitted two requests for public information. One request was sent to the Polish Police (through Press Office of The Police Headquarters), and another one to the Ministry of Justice. The Police were asked about the number of initiated investigations concerning crimes against information security and other crimes committed with the use of Internet, as well as numbers of cases where investigations were discontinued and reasons for the decision. The results show that an overwhelming majority of investigations are discontinued due to the inability to establish the perpetrator. Most crimes against information security are related to unauthorized access to information (Art. 267 of Polish Penal Code, which unfortunately does not differentiate between physical and electronic access). Other crimes in which the Internet was used are mostly frauds, in particular during online transactions. These findings are in line with statistics of the Ministry of Justice,



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which we queried for numbers of trials and average sentences. Sadly, only one in about fifty crimes identified by the police result in a final conviction, with an average sentence of less than 9 months (using the same Art. 267 as an example).

4.2.3 NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY WITH REGARDS TO CYBERCRIME (POLAND)

Two major documents exist in regards to Poland's approach to cybersecurity. The first document is the "Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland 2015" (currently only available in Polish as "Doktryna Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015") (BBN (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego - National Security Bureau), 2015). While the document is broad in terms of discussing different cybersecurity issues, it essentially glosses over the topic of cybercrime, referencing it only twice and mentioning that it should be addressed, failing to mention the role of the Police in doing so.

The second document (which has an English version) is called the "Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland" (Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) published by MAIC in June 2013 (Ministry of Administration and Digitisation, Polish Internal Security Agency, 2013). While the document introduces the concept of cybercrime, even providing a definition "an offence committed in cyberspace" it also fails to elaborate on the topic.

It should be noted that none of these documents are acts of law and legally binding. It is expected that official legal acts in this area will be implemented once the EU NIS directive is established.

Nevertheless, it can be said that Poland currently lacks a comprehensive programme in combating cybercrime.

4.2.4 A COMPARISON OF STATISTICS

Reports in the statistics published by different parties signal a big disparity between the number of observed security (including cybercrime) incidents by CERT Polska and Government statics regarding cybercrime cases. Based on the surveys carried out in the CyberROAD project, it would appear that most cases are simply not reported to the Police. Subsequent Police investigations into cases appear to be not very effective, with few ending up in court. The situation can be summarized with a quotation from Jerzy Kosinski "Cybercrime in Poland 2011-2012 (Kosinski, 2012)":

"It can be said, that computer piracy has become one of a few areas of computer crime where the police are effective."

This may be because the affected companies are determined to fight with this problem, and have the resources to hire law firms and push legal cases.

Another point in the paper worth noting:

"Computer frauds such as interfering with input data, program or output are often a black number. Afraid of having their reputation undermined, banks, offices and companies often fail to inform the police and the public about them."

The Eurobarometer survey on Cyber Security highlights another aspect of the problem:

"Whilst the value of the cybercriminal economy as a whole is not precisely known, the losses are thought to represent billions of euros per year. The scale of the problem is itself a threat



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to law enforcement response capability – with more than 150,000 viruses and other types of malicious code in circulation and a million people victims of cybercrime every day" (Eurobarometer TNS Opinion & Social, 2014)

Further evidence to support the view that most cases of cybercrime are not reported to the police is found in The United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report (UNODC, 2013), Annex 2 entitled, 'Measuring Cybercrime' (pgs 259 – 266):

"...police-recorded crime statistics capture only those events that come to the attention of the police.... For cybercrime events, the difference between victimization and police-recorded crime can be many orders of magnitude."

This report continues by using data from the Norton Cybercrime Report 2011 (Symantec, 2011):

"According to one population based survey of almost 20,000 individual internet users in 24 countries, only 21 per cent of respondents who said that they had been a victim of any cybercrime act indicated that they had reported the act to the police."

Survey results on this topic will be subject to further analysis and possible escalation to D₅.6.

4.3 TECHNOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE

This aspect is covered in detail in **D4.1** "**Technology Landscape Report**". For D5.1 this topic will be explored more fully through survey questions to obtain a viewpoint from a stakeholders' perspective..

4.4 SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, & LEGAL LANDSCAPES

As a subject this area is covered in detail in WP₃ (D_{3.1} Social, Economic, Political & Legal Landscapes). For D_{5.1} these topics are explored mainly through this deliverable's surveys. Survey #1 consists of a broad question base which Surveys #2 and #3 explore in more detail. It was considered if, for the second round of questions, there would be added value in designing a survey for each separate topic but in not wanting to make the surveys too laborious it was decided not to pursue that approach. Instead, for the second round there would be one technology-based survey and one survey that covered the other aspects – social, economic, political and legal.

In terms of the stakeholders, the 'EBP Triad' (see Section 2.1) is part of the analysis to determine in which category the sources from the stakeholder belong. This is to give an insight into the demographics of the participants in relation to the category of the stakeholder as a source (Aristolean, Galilean, Phenomolist) and to recognise the levels of representation across the social, economic, political and legal scale. This aspect will be escalated further for action in **D5.6**.

4.5 THE THREAT LANDSCAPE

Threats, what they are and what are the solutions, forms a major body of work within D_{5.4} Preliminary Cyber Security Solutions taxonomy for completion within D_{5.5} Cyber Security Solutions taxonomy. In D_{5.4} the importance of 'Threat Modelling' is outlined where the problem of technology designed without security as a priority is discussed. These issues have provided major impacts in the past and present a contributary reason for the vulnerabilities and weaknesses that cybercriminals have been able to exploit. If such issues are not addressed, similar problems will continue into the future.

ENISA provides a yearly overview of current and emerging cyber-threats in the showcase series of reports 'ENISA Threat Landscape' (ENISA, 2014). The 2014 report uses over 400 sources to display in



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detail the emerging trends and top cyber threats. Changes in the threat landscape over the previous year, shown in graphic form, provide easy-to-understand formats of the most relevant movements in this domain. Following these movements over time may provide evidences towards accurate predictions of what is to come and what may be considered as a lesser threat. Such evidences are valuable for decision makers, security experts and interested individuals as an aid in future planning.

The information provided by ENISA in these reports provided guidance on threats that was useful in designing relevant questions for the CyberROAD cybercrime surveys. According to ENISA the top 10 threats in the emerging landscape are:

- 1. Malicious code: Worms/Trojans
- 2. Web-based attacks
- 3. Web application attacks /Injection attacks
- 4. Botnets
- 5. Denial of service
- 6. Spam
- 7. Phishing
- 8. Exploit kits
- 9. Data breaches
- 10. Physical damage/theft /loss

The ENISA report provided a useful model to form survey questions related to the likelihood of occurrence and risk. In Section 6 of Survey #2 'Threats' (See Annex B) respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of occurrence of each of the ENISA top 10 emerging threats. This will provide interesting comparable data for further research and possible inclusion in D₅.6.

4.6 A QUESTION OF TRUST

The notion of Trust is central in the security domain, as all the relationships among people, associations, companies, etc. are based on trust and reinforced by legal entities. Moreover, when decisions are to be taken on the policies needed to prevent security incidents, reliable information is needed on the probability of the events, on the data that can be targeted by attacks, and on the value of data loss and recovery. Consequently, sound metrics on the number of cybercrime events, their effects, and the damage that actually was caused from incidents is necessary for defence and recovery actions.

4.6.1 WHAT IS "TRUSTED" DATA?

Trusted data needs an agreed upon protocol for its acquisition, the measurements to be performed on the data, and the ways to securely store the data to prevent data pollution. Data in the cyber age, however, is a multi-faceted entity with few established guidelines, or classifications, for these processes. Data storage on the scale required today and into the future presents new challenges.

This chain can be enforced by clear national and supra national regulations that must require a uniform way for assessing the value of the assets in terms of data of companies, and the requirement to communicate any incident that has incurred, as well as a method for measuring the reach of the incident.



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Incidents must be collected by a central point that ensures the correct processing of all data. This process in the EU is currently carried out by ENISA in an effort to provide for such trusted data. Metrics and protocols of communications still needs to be tailored in order to provide for data that should be not only be complete, but also reliable.

4.6.2 WHO CAN BE "TRUSTED" WITH DATA?

The adherence to standardized metrics and protocols allows trusting the party that provides such data. In other words, the protocols for gathering, processing and sending data to the central authority should provide in itself a means to assess the trust in those data.

4.6.3 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR / PRIVATE SECTOR /GOVERNMENT/ GOVERNANCE, IN INFORMATION SHARING

The experience in UK (Cyber Essentials (UK Govt, 2015)) and in the USA (NIST CyberSecurity Framework (NIST, 2013)) provide examples of how metrics and procedures can be found by a joint effort of the private sector and the government. While the government acts as the central point for standardization of metrics and procedures that allows the production of official statistics, private companies must help in devising the set of mechanisms that can be actually implemented and represent the optimal trade-off between the cost of the solution and the data needed for the final assessment.

4.6.4 TRUST – SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES

There is no shortage of materials available that disseminate information and data. The question that arises is what is the value of these? The lack of quantifiable metrics, standards and practices makes this an unknown expanse. Reviews of small representative examples of a genre reveal a number of research gaps in this area.

A review of a small sample of the many studies available reveals a number of key areas where more research would be beneficial. Despite the lack of a common methodology where a like-for-like comparison becomes problematic, it is possible to thematically group the exposed research gaps. These form into five key areas:

- a) Definitions/Taxonomy
- b) Metrics
- c) Trusted Data
- d) Standards/Benchmarks
- e) Threats/cybercrime

At the centre and common to all groups is the issue of "trust". This develops as a major theme that inter-links the individual parts. Diagrammatically, "trust" is a central supporting pivot.






Figure 3: The Pivot of Trust

The groups surrounding the "Pivot of Trust" provide a structured foundation for the study of the research gaps in relation to current scenarios. Each group could be considered as a worthy standalone subject in its own right. Groups may overlap to a larger or lesser degree and may be disproportionate in terms of the subject range and extent but, in terms of importance to Trust, each has equal value.

The above scenarios will be recommended for further research in D₅.6.

4.6.5 A SEARCHABLE DATABASE OR KNOWLEDGE BASE

Section 4 has provided an overview of a number of perspectives that form the state-of-th-art. Although it's not possible to review every report and research paper in this assessment, a different approach was begun that could provide a lasting legacy beyond the end of the project.

In bringing together the evidence-based practices of 'The Triad' a searchable database was compiled to act as an aid for relevant references that have either been used in the project or have relevance to the sate-of-the-art. The database contains references categorised according to the 3 groups and embodies the aims of D_{5.1} in using innovative practices to further the purposes of research.

The database will continue to be populated and developed as the project progresses (See Annex F).

It is anticipated that under or over representation of topics or areas of study will be revealed over time as more records are added. Work on this will continue beyond D_{5.1} and may contribute towards a full review of the current state of the art which is a research topic in its own right. This could serve as a useful central repository for references for other EU projects and save precious research time at the start of projects.



5 **SURVEY ANALYSIS**

Continuing with the theme of a macro to micro analysis and to provide an early snapshot appraisal of the surveys it was decided that a specific country, Poland, should be used to compare with other regions. Poland was selected as it is one of the larger EU countries and is also represented by a national CERT team (CERT Polska) in the CyberROAD consortium. A Polish translation of both rounds of the Delphi-type questionnaire were prepared and made available through network connections, colleagues, CyberROAD.eu website and social media outlets.

Results from the Polish survey were compared against two other recent and well respected surveys: a) The Eurobarometer survey (conducted Oct 2014) on Cyber Security for the European Commission (Eurobarometer TNS Opinion & Social, 2014) and b) "EU Cybersecurity Dashboard" study by the BSA released in March 2015 (BSA, 2015).

5.1 SURVEY OVERVIEW – MACRO PERSPECTIVE

In following the Delphi survey approach **Survey #1 Cybercrime** was designed to include a wide range of topics within the scope of cybercrime. A few points of interest are:

- Overall participation was good with over 600 respondents completing the whole English version (as at 11th May 2015).
- Some questions had considerably more respondents (up to 850) than others.
- More than 200 respondents volunteered a contact email address for further participation in Surveys 2 & 3.
- For the Polish version over 350 participants completed Survey #1 (as at 11th May 2015).
- Respondents came from 42 countries around the world although the largest groups were from Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, United States, UK, Greece and Austria.

<u>Survey #2</u> (Technology & Organisation) and <u>Survey #3</u> (Economic, Political & Social Issues) were prepared using early results from Survey #1. The process involved is depicted in <u>Annex D</u>. All 3 surveys are ongoing in order to gain as much input as possible. A final cut-off date has yet to be decided and all end results will be escalated to D₅.6 for further analysis.

In the following sections an early sample analysis for each topic type is represented. This serves to illustrate themes suitable for escalation to D₅.6. Survey questions are available in Annexes A-C.

Note: All data is from responses available as at 11th May 2015.



5.1.1 ORGANISATIONAL – MACRO VIEW

The definition of cybercrime is a key topic for this deliverable and is a recommended theme for further research. Answers from the question "For me, cybercrime is ...) in Survey #1 (Figure 4) indicate that definitions of cybercrime vary greatly. Results from organisational based questions will contribute towards **D5.6 Cybercrime research topics**




Figure 4: Cybercrime definition



5.1.2 TECHNOLOGY - MACRO VIEW

Enquiry into Technological themes is of major interest with questions covering a wide range of aspects. The sample in Figure 5 shows the most widely adopted security applications used by individuals. Figure 6 shows those used by organisations. Results from technology based questions will contribute to **D5.6 Cybercrime research** topics. The variation between the results is of note. Refer to surveys in **Annexes A-C**.




Figure 5: Security applications used by individuals




Figure 6: Security applications used by organisations



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5.1.3 SOCIAL – MACRO VIEW

Social aspects of cybercrime is explored in detail in **D3.1**, **Social**, **Economic**, **Political and Legal Landscape**. It would be virtually impossible to conduct a survey without some form of social enquiry and results from D5.1 will contribute towards **D3.3 Social**, **Economic**, **Political**, **and Legal research topics** and **D5.6 Cybercrime research topics**. The sample result show in Figure 7 indicates high levels of concern about cybercrime. Refer to surveys in **Annexes A-C**.




Figure 7: Concerns about cybercrime



5.1.4 LEGAL - MACRO VIEW

Legal aspects of cybercrime is explored in detail in D_{3.1}, Social, Economic, Political and Legal Landscape. Results from questions related to legal aspects of cybercrime from D_{5.1} will contribute towards D_{3.3} Social, Economic, Political, and Legal research topics and D_{5.6} Cybercrime research topics. The sample depicted in Figure 8 indicates low levels of reporting to police. Refer to surveys in <u>Annexes A-C.</u>




Figure 8: Levels of reporting cybercrime to police



5.1.5 ETHICAL – MACRO VIEW

Ethics in relation to cybercrime can be sometimes be a contentious issue and based on subjective analysis. The sample of the type of question asked on this topic (Figure 9) reveals that better education for users and improved technologies are the preferred options for more research. Results from Ethical questions will contribute towards **D5.6 Cybercrime research topics**. Refer to surveys in **Annexes A-C**.




Figure 9: What should be topics for research? (Respondent count 609)



5.1.6 POLITICAL – MACRO VIEW

Political aspects of cybercrime is explored in detail in **D3.1**, **Social**, **Economic**, **Political and Legal Landscape**. Results from questions in Surveys #1, #2 and #3 that relate to legal aspects of cybercrime from D5.1 will contribute towards **D3.3** and **D5.6 Cybercrime research topics**. Refer to surveys in **Annexes A-C**. Figure 10 shows that most respondents see cybercrime as being rooted in economic interests.




Figure 10: Respondent choices on the root causes of cybercrime

5.1.7 ECONOMIC - MACRO VIEW

Some economic aspects of cybercrime is explored in **D3.1**, **Social**, **Economic**, **Political and Legal Landscape**. Results from questions related to legal aspects of cybercrime from **D5.1** will contribute towards **D3.3** and **D5.6 Cybercrime research topics**. Figure 11 shows the amount spent by individuals on preventing cybercrime. Refer to surveys in **Annexes A-C**.




Figure 11: Individual spend on cybercrime prevention (USD)

5.2 AN EARLY ANALYSIS FROM A MICRO PERSPECTIVE (POLAND)

The initial results of the first survey are summarized below with an attempt to highlight the main differences between Polish and English speaking respondents:

- There is still a lot of confusion regarding definitions of cybercrime: most respondents understand cybercrime as being "Criminal activity carried out by means of computers or the Internet" or "Any act against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems".
- ➤ Polish respondents stated that cybercrime was a lesser concern for there organization compared to the English language respondents (39.2% of the respondents said that cybercrime was only a slight concern or none at all vs 16% of the English survey). This is despite that fact that individually, respondent concern was at similar, if not slightly higher levels.
- Security training levels of respondents were slightly lower than the English language survey respondents, with 73.1% of respondents receiving no training or only after a problem is identified vs 63.2% for the English survey. (Note: We included 'Don't know' as a de facto no training answer here as well).



- A higher percentage of Polish respondents had experienced cybercrime action in the last 5 years in a personal capacity (43% vs 26.7% English language survey respondents).
- A low impact of cybercrime for Polish respondents as victims: "inconvenience" or "no effect" gathered the most responses (41% and 42.6% respectively). The English survey responses were (46.8% and 33.3% respectively).
- A low reporting rate of cybercrime cases to the Police (31%), similar to the English survey responses (30.4%).
- A low successful Police action and prosecution rate (5.3%), similar to the English survey responses (7.2%).
- Low reporting rates to CERTs similar to English survey respondents (not reported by 84.4% of Polish survey respondents vs 80.3% English survey responses).
- A low tendency to share information on attacks with other organizations lower than that of respondents of the English language survey. (21.1% vs 35.4%).
- Education was pointed out as the main area for improvement (74.6% of English survey respondents 72,3% stated it was a "very important" element to improve)

5.2.1 THE EUROBAROMETER SURVEY ON CYBER SECURITY

The Eurobarometer survey (conducted Oct 2014) on Cyber Security for the European Commission (Eurobarometer TNS Opinion & Social, 2014) gives insights into perceptions and experiences of EU citizen with cybercrime. It is also useful in providing a more in-depth comparison of Poland versus the rest of Europe.

- ➤ The most basic conclusion is that the average Pole is not very concerned with cybercrime. Responses to concerns regarding online banking payments were the second lowest in Poland out of all the EU countries surveyed (29% of respondents) and lowest when it came to potential misuse of personal data (25% of respondents).
- ➤ Polish respondents were least likely to say that they have changed the way they use the Internet due to security concerns.
- ➤ Polish respondents were among the least likely to say that they have installed anti-virus software (only 43%), least concerned about opening emails from people they do not know (29%), least regularly changing their passwords (14%) and one of the least likely to use different passwords for different sites (17%) or change settings (8%).
- Despite these not very positive statistics, there was a general improvement of security issues, at least declared by the respondents up 21% compared to a similar study in 2011.

In terms of cybercrime concerns, there are also some different perceptions compared to other EU countries:

- ➤ Poles declared one of the highest concerns of online fraud (defined as "goods purchased were not delivered, counterfeit or not as advertised").
- Encounters with online child pornography was the second highest in the EU, concerns with hatred materials were also above average.
- Denial of access to services is an area of concern for respondents, but not experienced by most
- Personal data security concerns (having their e-mail account or social account hacked) was an area of lower concern and personal experience than in most other EU countries.



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- ➤ Online banking fraud, was slightly less personally experienced by Polish respondents compared to the EU average, as well as slightly less an area of concern Cyberextortion (through ransomware) was deemed as slightly more concerning for Polish respondents than the EU average, but their experience with this form of cybercrime was equal to the EU average.
- ➤ Malicious software was deemed as slightly more concerning for Polish respondents but less experienced in practice than the EU average.

The authors of the survey make an interesting observation: "the survey findings suggest that a greater knowledge of cybercrime leads to a preference to contact organisations such as the website or vendor rather than the police." Polish respondents often quoted the Police as appropriate contact for cyber security issues - although compared to Police statistics, it appears that there is little reporting actually carried out. On the other hand, a PwC Crime Survey 2014 study (PwC, 2014) noted a drop in cybercrime as a problem for survey respondents -> 24% (2011) to 19% (2014). This is below worldwide average (24%), and also contrary to CERT Polska reports and statistics.

5.2.2 BSA REPORT ON LEGISLATION

A recent "EU Cybersecurity Dashboard" (BSA, 2015) study by the BSA released in March 2015 provides an overview of the cybersecurity landscape in Europe from the legislation and policy perspective, in particular covering aspects such as: "legal foundations for cybersecurity", "operational capabilities", "public-partner partnerships", "sector-specific cybersecurity plans" and "education". Poland was found to have a "comprehensive cybersecurity strategy with clear goals" but many were viewed as not yet implemented, and the legal cybersecurity framework not fully developed (in the opinion of the creators of the study).

Missing elements, according to the BSA, included:

- ➤ No legislation or policy in place in Poland that requires the establishment of a written information security plan.
- > There is no legislation or policy in place in Poland that requires an annual cybersecurity audit
- ➤ There is no legislation or policy in place in Poland that requires an annual cybersecurity audit.
- ➤ There is no legislation or policy in place in Poland that requires each agency to have a chief information officer or chief security officer.
- ➤ There is no defined public-private partnership for cybersecurity in Poland.
- > There are no new public-private partnerships being planned in Poland.
- > Poland does not have sector-specific joint public-private plans in place
- ➤ Sector-specific security priorities have not been defined.
- Sector-specific risk assessments have not been released

5.2.3 OVERVIEW FROM A MICRO PERSPECTIVE - POLAND

In terms of the initial conclusions regarding cybercrime in Poland, the following has been observed as part of this study:

> There are sufficient cybercrime penal laws in place, but there appears to be a lack of adequate enforcement. Even if cases are reported, most end up discontinued.



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- ➤ Reporting rate of cybercrime incidents to authorities appears to be low. Most Polish users report cybercrime effects as a mere "inconvenience", which may also result in the relative absence of Police reports.
- ➤ There is no national plan to tackle cybercrime. Existing documents that attempt to establish cybersecurity policies at the national level do not devote sufficient attention to the problem or recognize the complexity of the problem.
- There is a lack of good statistics and metrics to measure cybercrime levels and costs resulting from cybercrime - a problem that applies not only to Poland. We have to move beyond just technical observations of the tools used (like malware or malicious pages) and associated measurements and more into cybercrime itself.
- There is no established link between cases reported to the Police, successful prosecution in court and technical measurements/statistics from CERT reports.
- ➤ Awareness of cybercrime issues among the general public in Poland appears to be lower than in most other EU countries. Education should thus be viewed as a key component of a future national plan to tackle cybercrime.
- There appears to be a need for more active promotion of CERTs in Poland, in order to increase the rate of reporting of incidents.
- ➤ (From section4 as in the statistical system used by the Police in 2013 it is not obligatory to clearly state if a crime was committed on a computer network or the Internet.)

5.3 EARLY SURVEY ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions from these topics will form the basis for possible research topics for the roadmap gap analysis in D₅.6. Of interest is the variation, or similarity, in results when comparing the macro view (world) with the micro view (Poland). Further analysis here is required as is a view from a purely EU perspective.

Some of the topics covered are expected to provide new information in areas that are not frequently covered in surveys. One example is the question concerning levels of training within organization. Another area of interest is the amount of best practices in operation within organisations.

On completion of the analysis an assessment of possible research areas for escalation to D₅.6 will be considered. An overview of the recommendations gathered from both the early survey analysis and other body of work within this deliverable is in Section 7: Conclusions and Recommendations.



6.1 CURRENT SCENARIO

At present, the vast majority of governments address cyber security more within the framework of national defense rather than from the point of view of the protection of individual, social, end economic assets. One of the main reason lies in the lack of clear figures on the real impact of computer incidents that prevents understanding:

- The extension of the threat (i.e., number of computers, individual, enterprises, etc. that have been victims of attacks)
- The total loss that was caused by attacks, both in terms of tangible and intangible assets

In such a scenario, it is quite difficult if not impossible, to take decisions on:

- The policies to set up in terms of education, training, awareness, as well as in terms of software and system verification and certification
- The money to spend to implement the above policies, are today quite limited as the real impact in terms of saving is not well defined.

In fact, laws and regulations need to be grounded on reliable data, that clearly shows how the money spent in prevention and monitoring actually decrease the likelihood of more serious consequences.

It turns out that the current scenario poses a serious threat as the lack of coordinated and focused actions from the legislative and government bodies paves the way for various forms of criminal activities that, if not properly tracked and recorded, does not provide evidence of the existence of a real threat.

6.2 FUTURE SCENARIO

An example of a desirable future scenario is one in which governments can rely on solid methodologies to collect reliable figures about the real impact of cybercrime on companies, individuals and the public sector in order to take decisions, and allocate budget that is proportionate to the real threat.

In this scenario:

- ➤ Individuals, companies and the like have a high level of awareness on the possible uses of their data by public and private bodies, thus assigning a value to their data
- The market is mature enough so that a value can be assigned to each piece of information
- ➤ It is mandatory to disclose cyber-attacks and data breaches to a central authority, associating the costs incurred in terms of lost assets, lost business, repair/refactoring of software, and of business procedures.
- ➤ The above obligation implies that novel techniques are in place that allow assessing the influence of the attack and data breach

On the basis of past data, and of the actual market values, cost estimates are possible. Consequently, it is possible to devise policies that are cost-effective in containing the vulnerability of software and systems, handling security incidents, and preventing their rapid diffusion.



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As a scientific discipline, cybercrime is still in its infancy. Value can, therefore, be gained from the evolutionary experiences of other sciences. For example, research without some form of taxonomy would be chaotic in any area.

Accuracy of data is fundamental to other scientific research areas and is dependent upon tried and tested metrics for measurement. In some disciplines unreliable or untrustworthy data could be life threatening. With the advent of the Internet of Things, this could become a critical issue. Measurement is an essential, too, of risk assessment.

The issue of trusted data is emerging as an important topic as a result of this analysis. What trust is and how to quantify this is an element that has significant impact at ground-level involving perceptions as well as real events.

Trust and metrics are interwoven with the field of standards and benchmarks. Standards in industry are a cornerstone to improved safety, reliability and trust. Currently, this is not the case in the cybersecurity industry.

Initially, it would seem that the most importance place for more research would be in additional study of threats but it has emerged that this is only one of several key elements. Study of threats is essential but it is important to know if the money is being spent on the right type of investigation. To know this with any certainty there has to be a greater understanding of the metrics and measurement of all disciplines.

6.3 STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS

Survey analysis continues for escalation in D6.4 where potential research gaps will be investigated at a deeper level. An initial and brief evaluation suggests that, overall, stakeholders' needs are not currently being met.

When asked, 'Are you concerned about cybercrime', **88 percent of respondents answered that they were 'Moderately' to 'Extremely' concerned, 9 percent were 'Slightly' concerned while only 3 percent were, 'Not at all concerned' (no. of respondents 728).** An **overwhelming majority (91.5%) were pessimistic** in believing that cybercrime will increase over the next 5 years.

Survey 2 'Technology & Organisation' and Survey 3 'Social, Economic and Political' will explore this topic more fully but, in line with other surveys such as the Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer TNS Opinion & Social, 2014), it is clear that stakeholders' fears, either real or perceived, are on the increase.

As analysis of the surveys will unfold a clearer picture of what are the major concerns of stakeholders. This will provide valuable supporting data for the generation of potential research gap scenarios.



7 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GAP ANALYSIS

Reliable data is a fundamental on which revenues and budgets rely from the top at government level down to board level and individual stakeholders. To understand a problem, to know what is and how to tackle it, is a task that presents greater challenges when the size and extent of that problem remains very much shrouded in mystery. This body of work is a contribution towards finding the research gaps in the cybercrime domain by observations from the stakeholders' perspective and analysis of the current landscape.

Cybercrime as a subject of study is still in its infancy and much can be learned from the evolutionary development of other recently established sciences. To begin, a clear taxonomy is an essential element from which a framework for further study can be developed. Investigation of current and future scenarios via focused surveys and comparison of measurement related cybercrime reports reveals a number of potential research gaps that will require attention if solutions are to be achieved by 2020. Fundamental to the issue is the ability to quantify what we have and where we want to go. Currently, this study reveals a mis-match between the experiences of stakeholders and the information to hand which can be improved with quantification of the issues and trusted metrics for costing, risk assessments, etc. Central to this information is the issue of trust, as without it there will be no confidence in the way forward with more time and money being spent in the wrong places. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that without quantification and measurement there will be no solution to the problem of cybercrime by 2020 or beyond.

7.1 WHERE ARE THE GAPS – CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

In <u>Section 4.6</u> A Question of Trust, a number of key areas for further research were identified in relation to the issue of trust. These topics also provide a concise summary of the problem areas as identified throughout this body of work. Some of the problem areas are not unique to a single topic which is representative of the need for cross-over and collaboration between different areas of study. Analysis of the surveys contains and final results will be used for the purposes of D₅.6 but from this study the topics for further research are:

- i) Definitions/Taxonomy
- ii) Metrics
- iii) Trusted Data
- iv) Standards/Benchmarks
- v) Threats/cybercrime

Each area is detailed further in the following subsections.

7.1.1 DEFINITIONS & TAXONOMY

- i) Definitions of cybercrime vary greatly and there is still a lot of confusion in this area. The question also arises: is having one concise definition relevant?
- ii) Without taxonomy/classification science would be chaotic: cybercrime (and the study of) is lacking clearer classification arrangements, naming, describing, groups, etc, for identification and other purposes.



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7.1.2 METRICS

- i) There is a mis-match between recorded cybercrime and victimisation. This is true for all crime statistics but evidences suggest that for cybercrime events the gap is greater. How can reporting rates be improved and the profile of CERTS, etc be raised?
- ii) There is a general lack of clear figures on the real impact of computer incidents. This is evidenced in the Polish Police system in 2013 where it was not obligatory to clearly state if a crime was committed on a computer network or the Internet. Is this a localised issue or a global one?
- iii) No measurement, no solution. What is a 'good' way of measuring quantatively & qualitatively? This is important for; budgets, governments, research, risk assessment, insurance, finance, defence, cyber security industry, and all stakeholders.
- iv) Can established models in other disciplines be used to improve measurement? Can innovative models aid in the balanced gathering of sources of evidence, e.g. evidence-based practices 'the EBP Triad' for quantitative and qualitative assessment?
- v) There is confusion in current costing models over inclusion of intangible entities. A clear classification is lacking.

7.1.3 TRUSTED DATA

- i) A reliable source is a fundamental of trusted metrics. What is a trusted/reliable source?
- ii) There is a mis-match between the value of data from corporate and individual perspectives. Data shared with marketing companies is valued higher that private data not shared; this accounts for a wide range in value, so which should be used, when and where? Should there be government-led regulation or left to the free market? Which valuation is to be trusted?
- iii) Sharing information on cyber attacks with appropriate entities records low levels of practice. What is an appropriate entity and how can this situation be improved? Is this tendency country specific?

7.1.4 STANDARDS AND BENCHMARKS

- i) There is a low rate of best practice policies for BYOD (Bring Your Own Devices) in general (28.3% for English, 34.5% for Polish respondents) whereas the majority of employees are allowed to use their own devices in the workplace (65.6% English, 34.5% Polish). This is a clear mis-match and a potential source for vulnerabilities in the workplace. There are clear differences in workplace practices between English and Polish respondents. There are several themes here for further research.
- ii) There are low levels of relevant certification within the workplace (21.4% English, 22.1% Polish respondents). While there was a high percentage of 'Don't know' answers, definite 'No' answers were also relatively high (33.2% English, 43.1% Polish respondents). More research is needed here, for example, how relevant are current certifications?

7.1.5 THREATS AND CYBERCRIME

i) An overwhelming majority of investigations into cybercrime are discontinued, many due to the inability to establish the perpetrator. The message is clear; the odds are clearly in favour of the cybercriminal. There are a variety of contributing factors and efforts to find solutions are needed.



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- ii) Governments tend to address cyber security and acts of cybrcrime within the framework of national defence which excludes the context of the protection of the individual, social, and economic assets. The question arises: should these be treated as separate issues?
- iii)) Security training levels of respondents to Survey #1 are low with most only receiving training if there has already been a problem or once a year (48.3% English, 43.6% Polish). More research on this topic is required.
- iv) Education was pointed out as the main area for improvement by survey respondents (74.6% of English, 72,3% of Polish respondents stated it was a "very important" element to improve).
- v) A higher percentage of Polish respondents had experienced cybercrime 43% vs 26.7% English language survey respondents. The English results are slightly higher than some other survey results. Further research in this area is required.
- vi) Analysis of the Polish macro view found that Poland lacks a comprehensive programme in combating cybercrime. Is this a feature that is unique to Poland?
- vii) The evolutionary process of cybercrime indicates that security was not a priority. Without a change towards security-by-design cybercrime will continue and possibly increase. Effective responses for the future (Internet of Things, The Third Platform Innovation Stage (IDC, 2014), etc) are needed to bring about greater integration of critical services.
- vii) Policies that are cost-effective in containing the vulnerability of software and systems, handling security incidents, and preventing their rapid diffusion are needed for the future.

7.1.6 MISCELLANEOUS

- i) An overview of the current landscape or state-of-the-art is an essential element in all research projects. For a study on cybercrime there are thousands of available papers, articles, books, periodicals, etc. A standard bibliography or central repository for these sources is a useful tool. It is especially useful if the sources are categorized according to the evidence origin. For CyberROAD, a means of categorising the source of evidences (the EBP Triad) was applied to a bibliography and made available to the whole project. The usefulness of this resource will be further explored in D₅.6.
- ii) Analysis from all survey results is ongoing with a cut-off date still to be determined.





CyberROAD

Development of the Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism research roadmap Research project funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme Grant agreement n°: 607642 - http://www.cyberroad-project.eu

CyberROAD Project Coordinator Department of Electrical and Electronics Eng. University of Cagliari P.zza D'Armi 09123 Cagliari, Italy

Subject: CyberROAD Deliverable "D5.1 – Stakeholder needs and threats evaluation" Data Sensitivity Report

Dear Prof. Roli,

following the examination of Deliverable "D5.1 – Stakeholder needs and threats evaluation", in my role of member of the CyberROAD Data Sensitive Committe, I would hereby confirm that no sensitive data or information is contained into the examined deliverable.

Sincerely,

May 27, 2015











































D_{5.1} Stakeholder needs and threats evaluation

Funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme



CyberROAD

Development of the Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism research roadmap Research project funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme Grant agreement n°: 607642 - http://www.cyberroad-project.eu

Prof. Fabio ROLI

CyberROAD Project Coordinator Department of Electrical and Electronics Eng. University of Cagliari P.zza D'Armi 09123 Cagliari, Italy

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Dear Prof. Roli,

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Sincerely, **David Vara Cuesta** May 27th, 2015











































SURVEY #1



CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1

Welcome to the CyberROAD Survey on Cybercrime

Thank you for participating in our survey.

CyberROAD is a research project funded by the European Commission. The project's aim is to identify current and future issues in the fight against cybercrime and cyberterrorism in order to develop a definitive research roadmap.

Cybercrime potentially affects all of us as technology penetrates ever deeper into our everyday lives. Appropriately, we should each be able to contribute to the development of a set of guidelines where the aim is to pinpoint areas of research that may currently be neglected or overlooked. The CyberROAD team would very much like your help in this matter in order that we may gather as much information, on a variety of subjects, as is possible.

We shall be providing an in-depth analysis of all the technological, social, legal, ethical, political, and economic aspects on which cybercrime and cyber-terrorism are rooted. You can contribute to this work through a series of 3 surveys. The intial survey targets basic aspects of your relationship with cybercrime, either personally or through your work.

We hope you will enjoy participating in our project and we look forward to your your responses. Please note the survey is anonymous and providing contact data is entirely optional

Data Protection

The CyberROAD project is committed to the protection of personal data. CyberROAD adheres to **Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000** on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community, institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. Further information is available here:

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/data_protection/l24222_en.htm

CybeROAD also adheres to the **Code of Standards and Ethics for Market, Opinion, and Social Research (CASRO)**. Further information is available here: http://www.casro.org/?page=TheCASROCode2014

Survey Contact - jart.armin@cyberroad.eu

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1 1. About You & Your Work i. In which country do you currently reside? ii. What is your age? O 65 + 18 to 24 35 to 54 55 to 64 © 25 to 34 iii. Where is the main business of your company located iv. How many employees work for your company? © 21-100 O 1-5 O 501-1000 6-20 O 101-500 O 1000+ v. Which category most closely fits your organisation type? Scholarly research C Internet service provider or operator Policy making, Govt, legal or law enforcement Consumer group or end-user Cyber security practitioner, cyber security expert (any field) Commercial business Other (please specify)

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1

2. The definition of cybercrime

i. Which of these definitions do you think best matches your view on cybercrime? (Note that individual countries set their own laws on crime and illegal activities in relation to computer offences.)

For me cybercrime is.....

	Less relevent	Average	Most relevent
Criminal activity carried out by means of computers or the Internet	0	0	0
Any illegal activity that uses a computer for the storage of evidence	\circ	\circ	O
Any criminal act or hacking of computers and networks	0	0	O
Theft using a computer or Internet	0	\odot	0
Any act against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems	O	O	O
The use of a computer system(s) to enable traditional form of criminal activity and the use of a computer system(s) to launch a cyber attack	O	O	O
None of these	0	0	0

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1 3. Cybercrime concerns i. Are you concerned about cybercrime? C Extremely concerned Moderately concerned Not at all concerned Very concerned Slightly concerned ii. Is cybercrime a concern for your organisation? Not at all concerned C Extremely concerned Moderately concerned O Very concerned Slightly concerned iii. Over the next 5 years do you think cybercrime will...? O Increase O Decrease Stay at the same level

4 100 - 4 - 1 1							
4. What does cybercrime mean to you?	4. What does cybercrime mean to you?						
i. Do you think cybercrime is?							
C Here to stay C Containable							
○ Solvable ○ Not much of an issue							
ii. Do you see cybercrime as a problem rooted in	?						
Not much Lesser	Average	Higher	Top cause				
Technology O	0	0	0				
Education C	0	0	0				
Society C	0	0	0				
Business strategy C	0	0	0				
Political C	0	0	O				
Economic interests	O	O	O				

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1

5. The targets of cybercrime

i. In your organisation, which do you think is most likely to be the target for cybercriminals?							
	Critical infrastructures		Logistics & supply chain				
	Intellectual Property Rights		Mobile devices (tablets, smartphones)				
	Personal data		Critical information				
	Cloud infrastructures		People (citizens)				
	Unmanned systems		People (employees)				
	On-Line services/Web applications		Workstations (Users' equipment)				
	Embedded systems		Communications with satellites, weather stations, etc.				
	Payment systems		Transport assets (airplanes, railways, ferries)				
	Banking & financial service		Business or personal reputations				

6. What risks are you exposed to? i. Does your organisation (or do you) apply risk management as part of a cyber security strategy? Yes O No O Don't know ii. Does someone in the company (or do you) formally and regularly keep up-to-date with cybercrime related news via...? C Generic newspapers and news Consulting companies Social network contacts broadcaster C Activities outsourced to external No time allocated to do this Specialized news sources company/ies iii. How often are staff given training about cyber security risks? Yearly Only if there is a problem Weekly Monthly O Never O Don't know iv. Does your organisation allow the use of Bring Your Own Devices (BYOD)? Yes O No v. Does your organisation have a best practices policy for BYOD? O Yes O No O Don't know

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1 7. The effects of cybercrime i. Have you experienced a cybercriminal action in the last 5 years in a...? Never Personal capacity ☐ Through work ii. If you have been a victim of cybercrime in the last 5 years, what was the effect of the action? Loss of money Inconvenience Loss of reputation ☐ Down time ☐ No effect Psychologically harmful iii. As a direct result of a cybercriminal attack or threat, did you/your work make any changes to the cyber security strategy? Yes O Don't know O No O N/A iv. If you have experienced a cyber attack, do you think it posed a systemic risk to you or your organisation? O No Yes Don't know v. If you have been a victim of cybercrime, what action followed? Reported to the police with no further action Not reported to police Reported to the police, who contacted me/my organisation O Didn't know how to report to the police but no further action took place Other Reported to the police, who followed it through but no prosecution took place C Reported to the police, who followed it through to successful prosecution vi. If you have been a victim of cybercrime, did you contact your national or government **CERT for assistance?** Reported to national or government CERT, with no further action Reported to national or government CERT, with action on their part O Did not contact CERT but I know the police did O Did not contact my national or government CERT because I thought it was irrelevant O Did not know I could report to a CERT O Do not know what a CERT is or how to contact them

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1

8. Security Management

i. Which of the following sec devices?	urity applications do you use	e on your own computing
Firewalls	☐ Data encryption	☐ Hash generator
Antivirus	Early warning system	Back-up system (cloud or onsite)
Vulnerability scanning	☐ VOIP encryption	
☐ Spam blocker/secure email gateway	Password manager	
ii. Which of the following sec	curity applications does your	organisation use?
Firewalls	☐ Early warning system	☐ SIEM (Security information and event
☐ Antivirus	☐ VOIP encryption	management)
☐ Vulnerability scanning	☐ Password manager	☐ Back-up system (cloud or onsite)
☐ Spam blocker/secure email gateway	☐ Hash generator	☐ IDS/IPS solution
☐ Data encryption	☐ VPN Dedicated resources	DLP solution
Other (please specify)		
In-house by someone who is in charge of behalf of the organisation, e.g., a sysadmin?In-house CERT	C By the Interne	a independent specialist or organisation
O I manage my own cyber security	○ Don't know	
<u> </u>	,	nare information about cyber
events/attacks with an outsi Yes v. Do you/your organisation he.g., ISO 27001?	O No	© Don't know / Management certificates,
○ Yesv. Do you/your organisation he.g., ISO 27001?	େ No nold any Information Security	y Management certificates,
v. Do you/your organisation fe.g., ISO 27001? Yes vi. Do you/your organisation Penetration testing	No No No No No Audits	Management certificates, O Don't know
v. Do you/your organisation he.g., ISO 27001? Yes vi. Do you/your organisation	© № nold any Information Security © № use the following security te	Management certificates, O Don't know esting techniques?

Pick a major currency t	for these economic q	uestions	
	rsonally spend annua	ally on cyber s	security, e.g. anti-virus, anti
spam, upgrades, etc.?			,
C 0		O 101 -250	
O 1-100		C 250+	
ii. How much does you	r organisation spend	l annually on o	cyber security products?
O 0	C 101 -500		O 1,000 - 10,000
O 1-100	© 501 - 1,000		C 10,000+
ii. What do you think is	s the cost of cybercri	me to the eco	nomy of your country of
esidence per annum?			
O Up to 25 million		C 100 million+	
C 26m - 100m		C No idea	
v. What do you think is	s the cost of cybercri	me to the wor	ld economy?
C Less than 1billion	C 11bn - 25bn		Over 100 billion
C 1bn - 10bn	C 26bn - 100bn		○ No idea

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1

10. Research into cybercrime

To make the Internet a safer place and to fight cybercrime, what are the topics we should research into?

	Not Important	Important	Very important
Better metrics and statistics on cybercrime			
Better laws and regulations			
Improved technology for our networks and operating systems			
Improve our understanding of society and the cyber community			
Better encryption and improved privacy	П		
Better education of users of the Internet			
Other (please specify)			

CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #1 11. Next steps Are you willing to participate in another and more advanced survey, to help develop the definitive research roadmap on cybercrime? O Yes The following information is optional. If you're happy to give us your contact information we will inform you of the overall survey results, and when Questionnaire 2 (out of 3) is ready for your input. Your personal details will not be used for any other purpose. Thank you for participating. Name Company **Email Address**

Dziękujemy za udział w naszej ankiecie

CyberROAD jest projektem badawczym finansowanym przez Komisję Europejską, którego celem jest określenie obecnych i przyszłych problemów w walce z cyberprzestępczością i cyberterroryzmem oraz wypracowanie planu badań nad tymi zagadnieniami.

Cyberprzestępczość potencjalnie będzie wpływać na nas wszystkich wraz z postępującym przenikaniem nowych technologii w każdy aspekt naszego życia codziennego. Właściwie każdy z nas powinien móc przyczynić się do opracowania szeregu wytycznych, których celem byłoby wskazania obszarów badań nad tym zagadnieniem, które obecnie mogą być zaniedbywane lub wręcz pomijane. Zespół CyberROAD byłby bardzo wdzięczny za Waszą pomoc w tej kwestii, tak abyśmy mogli zebrać jak najwięcej informacji z uwzględnieniem wielu punktów widzenia.

Naszym celem jest przeprowadzenie szczegółowej analizy wszystkich aspektów technologicznych, społecznych, prawnych, etycznych, politycznych i ekonomicznych, które wpływają na rozwój cyberprzestępczości i cyberterroryzmowi. Możesz przyczynić się do tej pracy poprzez uczestnictwo w serii trzech badań. To pierwsze, wstępne, badanie dotyczy podstawowych doświadczeń ankietowych z cyberprzestępczością, czy to w życiu prywatnym czy też zawodowym.

Mamy nadzieję, że będziecie zadowoleni z uczestnictwa w naszym projekcie - czekamy na Wasze odpowiedzi! **Uwaga: udział w ankiecie jest anonimowy, a podanie danych kontaktowych opcjonalne.**

Ochrona danych osobowych

Projekt CyberROAD zobowiązuje się do ochrony danych osobowych. CyberROAD stosuję się do rozporządzenia (WE) nr **45/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z 18 grudnia 2000** w sprawie ochrony osób fizycznych w związku z przetwarzaniem danych osobowych przez instytucji i ciała Wspólnoty, oraz swobodnego przepływu tych danych. Więcej informacji dostępnych jest

tutaj: http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/information society/data protection/l24222 en.htm

CyberROAD stosuje się również do Kodeksu Etyki i Standardów Rynku, Opinii i Badań Społecznych **Code of Standards and Ethics for Market, Opinion, and Social Research (CASRO)**. Further information is available here: http://www.casro.org/?page=TheCASROCode2014

- Poprzez przekazanie CyberRoad swoich danych osobowych Użytkownik wyraża zgodę na przetwarzanie przez CyberROAD danych osobowych Użytkownika w związku z jego udziałem w ankiecie.
- Administratorem danych osobowych jest CyberDefcon Ltd, The Old Casino, 28 Fourth Avenue, Hove, E Sussex, BN3 2PJ, UK
- Podanie przez Użytkownika danych osobowych jest dobrowolne.
- Po zakończeniu ankiety CyberRoad nie będzie uprawniony do przetwarzania danych osobowych Użytkownika.
- · Zgoda na przetwarzanie danych osobowych może być w każdym czasie przez Użytkownika odwołana.
- Użytkownik ma w każdym czasie prawo wglądu w swoje dane osobowe przekazane CyberRoad, poprawiania ich i żądania ich usunięcia poprzez wysłanie oświadczenia drogą elektroniczną do admin@cyberdefcon.com

Więcej informacji lub pytania: info@cert.pl

CyberROAD: Badania nad cybeprzestępczością w Polsce - Ankieta #1 1. O Tobie i Twojej pracy i. W jakim kraju obecnie mieszkasz? ii. Ile masz lat? O od 35 do 54 O od 18 do 24 O od 65 + O od 25 do 34 O od 55 do 64 iii. Gdzie mieści się główna siedziba Twojej firmy? iv. Ile osób pracuje w Twojej firmie? O 1-5 © 21-100 O 501-1000 6-20 O 101-500 O 1000+ v. Która kategoria najlepiej opisuje Twoją organizacje? C uczelnia, instytut badawczy O grupa konsumencka, użytkownik końcowy, osoba prywatna administracja rządowa, organy legislacyjne, prawnicze instytucja komercyjna praktyk lub ekspert bezpieczeństwa komputerowego inne (proszę uszczegółowić) dostawca Internetu, operator sieci

2. Definicja cyberprzestępczości

i. Która z poniższych definicji najlepiej pasuje do Twojego rozumienia cyberprzestępczości? (Uwaga: poszczególne Państwa mogą inaczej ustanawiać prawo w zakresie przestępczości i nielegalnych działań związanych z użyciem komputera lub sieci)

Dla mnie cyberprzestępczość to

	Mniej istotne	Średnie	Najbardziej istotne
Działalność przestępczą wykonywaną za pośrednictwem komputera/Internetu	O	0	0
Każda nielegalna działalność której ślady mogą pozostać na komputerze	O	0	O
Każda działalność przestępcza związany z włamywaniem się do komputera i sieci	0	0	O
Kradzież z użyciem komputera/Internetu	0	0	O
Każda działalność przeciwko poufności, integralności, dostępności danych komputerowych i systemów/sieci	0	0	O
Użycie komputera/systemów komputerowych do tradycyjnych form przestępczości i użycie komputerów do przeprowadz	0	O	O
Żadne z powyższych	0	0	O

3. Zagadnienia związane z cyberprzestępczością

i. Jak bardzo przejmujesz się cyberprzestępczością?							
C Bardzo mocno	0	Średnio	W ogóle się nie przejmuję				
C Mocno	0	Tylko trochę					
ii. Czy cyberprzestępczość j	est	problemem dla Twojej organi	zacji?				
C Bardzo dużym problemem	0	Średnim problemem	W ogóle nie jest problemem				
O Dużym problemem	0	Niewielkim problemem					
iii. Czy uważasz, że przez na	jbliż	zsze 5 lat cyberprzestępczoś	ć				
C Zwiększy się	0	Zmniejszy się	Pozostanie na tym samym poziomie				

4. Czym dla Ciebie jest cyberprzestępczość?								
i. Czy uważasz, że cyberprzestępczość?								
C jest zjawiskiem, które zav	jest zjawiskiem, które zawsze będzie obecne jest problemem, który można ograniczyć							
jest problemem, który zo	stanie rozwiązany		nie jest żadnym pi	oblemem				
ii. Czy uważasz, że cyberprzestępczość to problem, którego źródła/przyczna tkwią w?								
	Nie bardzo	W mniejszym stopniu	W średnim stopniu	W większym stopniu	Wiodąca przyczyna			
technologii	0	0	O	O	0			
edukacji	0	0	0	\circ	\circ			
społeczeństwie	O	0	O	0	0			
strategii biznesowej	0	0	O	0	0			
polityce	O	0	0	0	0			
interesach ekonomicznych	0	O	O	O	O			

5. Cele cyberprzestępczości

tóre elementy w Twojej organizacji uważa erprzestępców?	asz	za najbardziej prawdopodobny cel dla
krytyczna infrastruktura		logistyka i łańcuch dostaw
prawa własności intelektualnej		urządzenia mobilne (tablety, smartfony)
dane osobowe		krytyczne informacje
infrastrukturę w chmurze		ludzie (obywatele)
systemy bezzałogowe		ludzie (pracownicy)
usługi on-line/aplikacje webowe		stacje robocze (sprzęt pracowników)
systemy osadzone		komunikacja z satelitami, stacjami pogodowymi itp.
systemy płatności		zasoby transportowe (samoloty, koleje, promy)
systemy bankowe i finansowe		reputacja biznesu lub poszczególnych osób

6. Na jakie ryzyka jesteś narażony? i. Czy Twoja organizacja (lub Ty sam) stosuje zarządzanie ryzykiem jako część strategii cyberbezpieczeństwa? ○ tak nie nie nie wiem ii. Czy ktoś w Twojej organizacji (lub Ty sam) formalnie i regularnie zapoznaje się z wiadomościami o cyberbezpieczeństwie za pośrednictwem...? O ogólnotematycznych gazet i serwisów firm konsultingowych Sieci społecznościowych informacyjnych C czynności prowadzonych przez nie alokuję na to czasu Specjalistycznych źródeł wiadomości zewnętrzne firmy w ramach outsourcingu iii. Jak często personel jest szkolony w zakresie ryzyk związanych z cyberbezpieczeństwem? C co tydzień C co rok C tylko wtedy, gdy wystąpi problem C co miesiąc nigdy O nie wiem iv. Czy w Twojej organizacji pozwala się na korzystanie z własnych urządzeń (BYOD)? v. Czy w Twojej organizacji opublikowano dobre praktyki w zakresie stosowania własnych urządzeń? C tak O nie O nie wiem

7. Skutki cyberprzestępczości

i. Cz lat	zy doświadczyłeś/doświad .?	lczyłaś działań	су	berprzestę	OCZ	ych w ciągu ostatnich 5
	w życiu osobistym	☐ w pracy				nigdy
	eśli byłeś/byłaś ofiarą cybe n zdarzeń?	erprzestępczoś	ści	w ciągu osta	atni	ch 5 lat, jaki był skutek
	strata pieniędzy	niedogodność				utrata dobrego imienia
	wstrzymanie pracy	obciążenie psychi	iczne			zaden
zmia	czy w wyniku ataku lub zag any do strategii cyberbezp				pro	wadzono w Twojej firmie
	nie		0	nie wiem		
syst	eśli doświadczyłeś/doświ emowe dla Twojej organiz		rata	aku, czy uw	aża	sz, że stanowił on ryzyko
0	tak	C nie			0	nie wiem
v. Je	eżeli byłeś/byłaś ofiarą cyb	erprzestępstw	va,	co zrobiono	w	tej sprawie?
0	zgłoszono sprawę na policję, ale nic się p	óźniej nie wydarzyło	0	nie zgłoszono sp	rawy i	na policję
	zgłoszono sprawę na policję, która skontak izacją, ale nic się później nie wydarzyło	towała się z moją	0	nie wiedziałem/w	viedzi	ałam jak zgłosić sprawę na policję
	zgłoszono sprawę na policję, która poprow wadzono do ukarania sprawców	vadziła ją, ale nie				
	zgłoszono sprawę na policję, która poprow nia sprawców	/adziła ją aż do				
się 2	eżeli byłeś/byłaś ofiarą cylez narodowym lub rządowy zgłoszono sprawę do rządowego lub narod zgłoszono sprawę do rządowego lub narod nie zgłoszono sprawy do CERT, ale wiem, Dnie zgłoszono sprawy do CERT poniewa: nie wiedziałem/wiedziałam że mogę zgło nie wiem, czym jest CERT i jak się z nim s	vm zespołem C lowego zespołu CERT, lowego zespołu CERT, że policja kontaktowała ż uznano to za nieodpo sić sprawę do CERT	ER ale n który a się	T? iic się później nie v podjął działania z takim zespołem		

8. Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem

i. Których z poniższych re	ozwiązań używa:	sz na swoich	urządzeniach?
firewalle	szyfrowanie da	anych	generator hashy
antywirusy	systemy wczes	snego ostrzegania	system kopi zapasowej (w chmurze lub
skanery podatności	szyfrowanie V	OIP	lokalnie)
blokady i filtry spamu	menadżer has	eł	
ii. Które z poniższych roz	wiązań używa T	woja organiza	cja na swoich urządzeniach?
firewalle	systemy wczes	snego ostrzegania	SIEM (Security information and event
antywirusy	szyfrowanie V	OIP	management)
skanery podatności	menadżer has	eł	system kopi zapasowej (w chmurze lub lokalnie)
blokady i filtry spamu	generator hash	ny	systemy IDS/IPS (wykrywanie intruzów)
szyfrowanie danych	dedykowane z	asoby VPN	systemy DLP (ochrona przed wyciekiem danych)
inne – jakie?			
iii. Jak zarządza się cybei	heznieczeństwe	m w Twoiei or	ranizacii?
wewnętrznie, przez osoby odpowie	-		rcing do niezależnego specjalisty lub firmy
(bezpieczeństwa), na przykład administra	• •		rce Internetu (ISP)
C własny CERT		nie wiem	oş memete (e.)
C sam/sama zarządzam cyberbezpie	czeństwem		
iv. Czy Ty, lub ktoś inny w	firmie, dzieli się	informacjami	o zdarzeniach i cyberatakach z
organizacją zewnętrzną?			
C tak	O nie		C nie wiem
v. Czy Ty lub Twoja organ informacji, np. ISO 27001		ertyfikaty z za	rządzania bezpieczeństwem
○ tak	○ nie		nie wiem
vi. Czy Ty lub Twoja orga	nizacja korzysta	z następujący	ch metod testów?
C testy penetracyjne	C audyty		C nie wiem
C testy podatności	O inne		

9. Wpływ ekonomiczny

Wybierz walutę, w któr	ej wyrażone będą kwo	ty w poniższ	zych pytaniach	
v				
i. Ile osobiście wydajes	•	_	oezpieczeństwa (np.	
antywirus, antyspam, a	ktualizacje) w skali rol	ku?		
O 0		O 101 -250		
C 1-100		○ 250+		
i. Ile Twoja organizacja	a na rozwiązania z zaki	resu cyberb	ezpieczeństwa w skali	roku?
O 0	O 101 -500		C 1,000 - 10,000	
O 1-100	O 501 - 1,000		O 10,000+	
ii. Jak oceniasz koszt (cyberprzestępczości d	lla ekonomii	Twojego kraju w skali	roku?
O do 25 milionów		O ponad 100 mli	1	
C 26 mln – 100 mln		nie mam poję	cia	
v. Jak oceniasz koszt (cyberprzestępczości d	lla światowe	ej ekonomii?	
C poniżej 1 miliarda	C 11 mld – 25 mld		C ponad 100 mld	
C 1 mld – 10 mld	© 26 mld – 100 mld		O nie mam pojęcia	
1 mld – 10 mld	© 26 mld – 100 mld		O nie mam pojęcia	

10. Badania nad cyberprzestępczością

Które tematy powinny być rozwijane badawczo aby Internet stał się bezpieczniejszym miejscem?

mejseemi			
	Nieważne	Ważne	Bardzo ważne
lepsze metryki i statystyki dotyczące cyberprzestępczości			
lepsze regulacje i przepisy prawa			
lepsze technologie w sieciach i systemach operacyjnych			
poprawa naszego rozumienia społeczeństwa i cyberspołeczności			
lepsze mechanizmy szyfrowania i poprawa prywatności			
lepsza edukacja użytkowników Internetu			
inne – jakie?			

11	. K	olejr	ie ki	roki

i i. Kolejile krok				
	ciałabyś wziąć udział w kolejnej, bardziej zaawansowanej ankiecie, vorzeniu mapy drogowej badań nad cyberprzestępczością? O nie			
Poniższe informacje są opcjonalne. Jeśli zechcesz przekazać nam swoje dane kontaktowe, przekażemy Ci wyniki zbiorcze tego badania ankietowego oraz poinformujemy gdy Kwestionariusz 2 (z 3) będzie gotowy do wypełnienia przez Ciebie. Twoje dane osobowe nie będą wykorzystywane w żadnym innym celu. Bardzo				
dziękujemy za ud	Iział w badaniu.			
lmię Nazwisko Adres email				

SURVEY #2





CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #2 - Technology & Organisation

Welcome to the CyberROAD Survey on Cybercrime

Thank you for participating in the CyberROAD Cybercrime Survey #2.

This questionnaire is a follow-on from Survey #1 where participants provided responses to questions exploring an individual's relationship to aspects of cybercrime. Survey #2 probes further into two specific areas: technology and organisations.

Additionally, a third questionnaire, Survey #3, concentrates on social, economic and political issues.

Each survey in this round is independent of the others so you may choose to complete Survey #2 only, or Survey #3 only, but please try to find the time to make your contribution to our project even more valuable by completing both. Survey #2 should take about 10-15 minutes to complete.

We hope you will enjoy participating in our project and we look forward to your responses. Please note the survey is anonymous and providing personal data is entirely optional.

CyberROAD is a research project funded by the European Commission. The project's aim is to identify current and future issues in the fight against cybercrime and cyberterrorism in order to develop a definitive research roadmap.

Data Protection

The CyberROAD project is committed to the protection of personal data. CyberROAD adheres to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community, institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. Further information is available here: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/data_protection/l24222_en.htm

CybeROAD also adheres to the Code of Standards and Ethics for Market, Opinion, and Social Research (CASRO). Further information is available here: http://www.casro.org/?page=TheCASROCode2014

Survey Contact - jart.armin@cyberroad.eu



CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #2 - Technology & Organisation

1. About You & Your Work

i. In which country do you currently reside?	
ii. Which category most closely fits your organize	cation type?
Scholarly research	Internet service provider or operator
Policy making, Govt, legal or law enforcement	Consumer group or end-user
Oyber security practitioner, cyber security expert (an	y field) Commercial business



CyberROAD: Cybercrime - Survey #2 - Technology & Organisation

2. Cybercrime definitions and classifications

i. Which of these definitions do you think best matches your view on cybercrime?

Survey 1 respondents were asked, "For me cybercrime is...?". The 3 most popular answers are below. Please indicate your choice of definition.

·	Less relevent	Average	Most relevent
Criminal activity carried out by means of computers or the Internet	0	0	0
Any criminal act or hacking of computers and networks	0	\bigcirc	0
Any act against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems	0	0	0
Other (please specify)			

ii. Which of these do you think of as cyber criminal actions?

	Cybercrime	Maybe cybercrime	Not cybercrime	Not sure
Spam	0	0	0	0
Phishing	\circ	0	0	0
Copyright infringement (e.g. movies, music)	0	0	0	0
DoS (denial of service) - critical safety operations (transport, utilities,etc)	0	0	0	0
DoS (denial of service) - non-critical operations	0	0	0	0
Interception of private communications	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\circ	\circ
Counterfeit goods online	0	0	0	0
Online fake pharmacy		0		\bigcirc
Online Child Sexual Abuse	\circ	0	0	0
Black hat SEO		0		0
Hacking into servers	0	0	0	0
Cybersex	\bigcirc	0		0
Cybersquatting	0	0	0	0
Website defacement	0	0	0	0
Cyber bullying	0	0	0	0
Bullet proof hosting	0	0	0	0
Tracking of web activity without permission	0	0	0	0
Writing malware or exploits	\circ	0	0	0
Using malware or exploits	0	0	0	0
Distributing malware or exploits	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\circ	\circ
Online fraud	0	0	0	0
Serving as a moneymule	\circ	\bigcirc	\circ	0
Other (please specify)				



3. The targets of cybercrime

 Most respondents indicated "personal data" as tronganisation. Is personal data managed in your organisation. 	, ,
All devices (desktop and portables) are company propert	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Secure workspace technology (IT has control over secur	e areas but no access to personal data)
Ontent management via app distribution and inventory	on all devices (company and BYO)
Personal data is not restricted on either company device	s or BYOD
Using company devices for personal data and content is	not permitted
Other (please specify)	
ii. Are you satisfied with the current privacy policies websites and social networks?	s on controlling the use of the personal data on most
○ Yes	O No
Further comments	
	1



4. Reducing risk & raising awareness

•	ents indicate BYOD is now common safe usage are low. How high	•	
High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Not a risk
ii. Do you think that t	there is a need for BYOD securit	y policies to be introduced	in every organization?
Yes		O No	
• •	s indicated a general lack of form c. Why do you think this is?	nal policies dedicated to cy	ber security management
Insufficient awarene	ess within executive management	Insufficient knowledge to p	repare the documents
Insufficient resource	es to prepare the documents	There is no need for such	policies
_	nd industry best practices are use useful could these tools be in imp	•	
Very useful	Useful	O Not u	ıseful
•	1 respondents staff training in cyl t, once a year. Why do you think	• •	takes place when there is
There is no need to	give regular security training to all staff	Lack of knowledge in the s	ubject
Only specific staff i.	e., those in a technical environment,	Lack of time/human resour	ces
Perceived low effect	ctiveness of training		
Lack of awareness	in executive management		



5. Cyber Security Management

i. Do you feel you share responsib	oility for cyber secu	rity of your con	npany or organisation?
Yes, I feel I share responsibility	I feel I only sha	are a small	No, it is not my responsibility
ii. Who in your opinion should take	e responsibility for	cyber security	on the Internet (pick 3)
Internet service and content provide	rs (ISPs & hosts)	The end us	er
Law enforcement		Your gover	nment
IT and security departments in comp	panies	Search eng	ine operators (Google, MSN, Yahoo etc,)
CERTS		Intergovern	mental and international organisations (UN, tc.)
iii. There are many forms of cyber	security training a	and certification	s available. Pick the 3 you would
choose as most important. Information Security (general)		Cyber Thre	at intelligence
Cyber security for IT Administrators			rtified Information Systems Security
Mitigation Strategies		Professional)	tilled information systems security
Incident prevention		Cyber secu	rity audits
Secure coding		Data securi	ty law
Defending web applications		Industrial c	ontrol incident response
Digital forensics		Compliance	;
		Hosting - S	ecuring Information Systems
iv. Survey 1 indicates that security tools (eg. EWS, VoIP encryption,		•	firewalls and antivirus while proactiv Why do you think this is?
Cost of such tools is too high		O Difficulty in	choosing the right tools
Lack of knowledge of such tools		Mindsets ne	eed to change about proactive security

v. Identity theft accounted for more than half the total Level-Index-Annual-Report-2014). How is the flow of	•
I'm not aware that the data flow is managed	Senstive data is encrypted for internal movement
Data is limited (contained) to certain places	Sensitive data is encrypted for external movement
The number of people with access to data is controlled	Encryption keys are securely stored
Users are authenticated	
vi. Does your organisation have an escalation route visuspicious?	where staff can report anything that seems
We have a proper action plan with designated people	I trust that nothing suspicious can get through to me
I am not actively encouraged to refer anything suspicious	Don't know - I'm not aware of one
vii. Respondents confirmed a low level of Information e.g. ISO 27001. Do such certificates provide real ben	
Yes, because they fulfil tender requirements	No, because they require too many resources
Yes, because they help increase security	No, they provide no benefits, just additional bureaucracy
Yes, because they are required by auditors	No, I don't see how they are relevant to my line of work
No, because they are too costly	What is ISO 27001?
viii. Most compromises are detected by an external e	entity. Do you think that this is because?
The majority of compromises are from insiders	Inability to detect network intrusion
Most organizations do not have the internal resources for compromise detection	Lack of awareness of data compromises
Many organizations are not able to detect exfiltration of	
data	
ix. Do you think there is too much pressure to premare despite security concerns?	turely roll out IT / web applications and projects,
O Yes	O No
x. If yes, what is the reason behind the pressure?	
Commercial	Lack of security testing within the product or application
Cost	plan
Poor project planning	Lack of standards or certification of IT applications and projects



6. Threats

 Social engineering is the most common form of atta phishing. How highly do you rate your ability to thwar 	
Very high - I don't think I would get caught out	I don't know what phishing is
High - I'm confident I would catch most phishing attempts	I don't know what spear phishing is
Moderate - I'm aware of what it is but I can't be sure I	I think everyone will fall for phishing, if it is well prepared
would spot it every time	for a specific person
O Not at all sure	

ii. Using the likelihood scale provided what, according to your own experience, is the likelihood of the listed cyber threats occurring?

Scale of Likelihood		Likelihood of occurrence	
Highly probable/Likely	10	1 per day - Very likely target	
Medium/Possible	5	1 per week - Possible target	
Low/Remote	2	1 per month - Remote target	
Negligible/Unlikely	1	Unexpected - Unlikely target	

Cyber threats (based on ENISA's Top Emerging Threats):

	Highly probable (10)	Medium/possible (5)	Low/remote (2)	Negligible/unlikely (1)
Malicious code: Worms/Trojans	0	0	0	0
Web-based attacks				
Web application / Injection attacks	0	0	0	0
Botnet activity	0	0		0
Denial of service (DoS, DDoS)	0	0	0	0
Spam	0	0		0
Phishing	0	0	0	0
Exploit kits	0	0		0
Data breaches	0	0	0	0
Physical damage/theft/loss	0	0		0
Insider threat	0	0	0	0
Information leakage	0	0		0
Identity theft/fraud	0	0	0	0
Cyber espionage	0	0		0
Ransomware/Rogueware/Scareware	e O	0	0	0
Cyber terrorism	0	0	0	0
Other (please specify)				

iii. What would be the consequences of a cyber attack on the following top targets from Survey #1

Level		Consequence on assets		
High/Severe	10	Irreparable harm to the company (1) may result in the highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede an organization's mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human death or serious injury		
Medium/Major	5	Significant harm (1) may result in the costly loss of tangible assets or resources; (2) may violate, harm, or impede an organization's mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human injury.		
Low/Moderate	2	Moderate harm (1) may result in the loss of some tangible assets or resources or (2) may noticeably affect an organization's mission, reputation, or interest.		
Minor	1	Very unlikely to cause any harm to the company or caused injuries		

Use the Consequence Scale to rate an asset at risk.

	Consequ	ence Scale	
Personal data		V	
Critical information		•	
Intellectual Property Rights		V	
On-Line services/Web applications		▼	
Critical infrastructures		V	
Workstations (Users' equipment)		▼	
People (employees)		▼	
Banking & financial service		▼	
Payment systems		▼	
Mobile devices (tablets, smartphones)		V	
iv. Please quantify the importance of the following	ng risks for your	· organisation.	
	Very important	Medium importance	Not important
Direct financial losses & damage (money stolen from accounts, regulatory fees, loss of clients, business, etc)	0	0	0
Indirect financial losses (loss of reputation, brand, trust, missed business opportunities, etc.)	\circ	0	\circ
Health & safety	\circ	\circ	0
Environmental	0	\circ	0
v. Please quantify the importance of threat anal	ysis to your plac	ce of work.	
Highest importance	O Not ve	ry high	
Important but other areas receive more attention	Low		



7. Trust

i. What sources of cybercrime data do you trust most?

	No trust at all	Reasonable level of trust	High level of trust
Security news articles	0	0	0
Cyber security bloggers			0
Government advisories	0	0	0
Academic papers / conference proceedings			0
Blacklists / block lists	0	0	0
Social media e.g via Twitter, Facebook, google+, & similar	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc
Your own discoveries e.g. log files, infections, & incidents	0	0	0
Anti-virus vendors		0	0
Cert vulnerability & threat advisories	0	0	0
Cyber security associations e.g Owasp, APWG, Maawg, & similar	0	0	\bigcirc
Other (please specify)			



8. Next steps

The following informa	ation is optional. If you're happy	y to give us your contact information we will inform you
of the overall survey	results. Your personal details	will not be used for any other purpose. Thank you for
participating.		
Name		
Company		
Email Address		

SURVEY #3





Welcome to the CyberROAD Survey on Cybercrime

Thank you for participating in the CyberROAD Cybercrime Survey #3.

This questionnaire is a follow-on from Survey #1 where participants provided responses to questions exploring an individual's relationship to aspects of cybercrime. Survey #3 probes further into three specific areas: social, economic and political issues.

A second questionnaire in this round, Survey #2, concentrates on technology and organisations.

Each survey is independent of the others so you may choose to complete Survey #2 only, or Survey #3 only, but please try to find the time to make your contribution to our project even more valuable by completing both. Survey #3 should take around 15 - 20 minutes to complete.

We hope you will enjoy participating in our project and we look forward to your responses. Please note the survey is anonymous and providing personal data is entirely optional.

CyberROAD is a research project funded by the European Commission. The project's aim is to identify current and future issues in the fight against cybercrime and cyberterrorism in order to develop a definitive research roadmap.

Data Protection

The CyberROAD project is committed to the protection of personal data. CyberROAD adheres to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community, institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. Further information is available here: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/data_protection/l24222_en.htm

CyberROAD also adheres to the Code of Standards and Ethics for Market, Opinion, and Social Research (CASRO). Further information is available here: http://www.casro.org/?page=TheCASROCode2014

Survey Contact - jart.armin@cyberroad.eu



1. About You & Your Work

i. In which country do you currently reside?	
▼	
ii. Which category most closely fits your organization	type?
Scholarly research	Internet service provider or operator
Policy making, Govt, legal or law enforcement	Consumer group or end-user
Oyber security practitioner, cyber security expert (any field)	Commercial business
Other (please specify)	



2. Cybercrime definitions and classifications

i. The development of a taxonomy (classification into an essential infrastructure in scientific research and c enumerate, improve communications, publicise result important is the building of a recognised taxonomy to	other fields of study. Taxonomies help to: identify and ts, metrics and ranking for funding, etc. How
Extremely	Not very important
Important but not essential	Not at all important
ii. Survey 1 respondents had no clear preference tow do you think it is to achieve an internationally recogni	•
Extremely	Not very important
Important	Not at all important
iii. What would be your definition?	
iv. Established cybercriminal <i>modus operandi</i> are influcrime, according to a recent report from Europol. Do 'conventional' crime?	
Yes	
O No	
It's becoming increasingly difficult to separate cybercrime are	nd conventional crime



3. Cybercrime concerns

i. How real a problem do you	think cyber espio	nage is?	
A matter of national security		O Poliitical propaganda	
Exaggerated		Legitmate form of intelliger	nce gathering
ii. Do you believe any of the fo	ollowing actions a	are socially acceptable?	
	Yes	No	Undecided
Spam	0	0	0
Phishing	0	0	0
Copyright infringement (e.g. movies, music)	0	0	0
DoS (denial of service) - critical safety operations (transport, utilities,etc)	0	0	0
DoS (denial of service) - non-critical operations	0	0	0
Interception of private communications	\bigcirc	\circ	0
Counterfeit goods online	0	0	0
Online fake pharmacy			\bigcirc
Online Child Sexual Abuse	0	0	0
Black hat SEO			0
Hacking into servers	0	0	0
Cybersex	0	0	0
Cybersquatting	0	0	0
Website defacement	0	0	0
Cyber bullying	0	0	0
Bullet proof hosting	0	0	0
Tracking of web activity without permission	0	0	0



4. Education in cybercrime

 Survey 1 respondents see cybercrim that cybercrime is mainly driven by an 	ne as a problem rooted mainly in economic interests. Do you believe
Yes	No
Please give a reason for your answer	
ii. Do you think it is possible to fully de	etermine the root causes of cybercrime ?
Yes	O No
Please give a reason for your answer	
iii. Respondents indicate a low level of responsible for the cost of training?	f training on cybersecurity within the workplace. Who should be
Governments	Schools/colleges by adding to the syllabus
Work organizations	O Yourself
iv. Should organisations require member Internet and cybercrime prevention?	bers of staff to hold a current license or qualification in use of the
Yes	O No



5. The targets of cybercrime

i. Why do you think most respondents to Survey 1 on not on a regular basis?	ly receive cybersecurity training after a problem and
There is no need to give regular security training to all staff	Lack of knowledge in the subject
Only specific staff i.e., those in a technical environment,	Lack of time/human resources
need regular training	Cost too high
Perceived low effectiveness of training	
Lack of awareness in executive management	
ii. Give an example of the cybercriminal activity you p	personally encountered either at home or at work.
Phishing	Malware
○ Spam	O Drive-by exploit from an infected website
Rogueware/Ransomware/Scareware	Ocode injection
Data Breaches (Compromising Confidential Information)	Exploit Kit
Information leakage	O DNS manipulation
Targeted Attack	Not sure what the cause was
Botnet	
iii. For previous victims of cybercrime only. Surve cybercrime as: "down time" & "inconvenience". How became a victim of cybercrime?	
< 4 hours	25 hours +
5 - 8 hours	0 60 hours +
9 - 24 hours	
iv. Do you believe that expected penalties for cybercr	rime are:
O Too low	O Too high
Adequate	Not sure what the penalties are



6. What risks are you exposed to?

i. Have we lost control of our personal data onlin	e?
O Yes	It's not important if control is lost
O No	It's time to take control back
ii. Do you think about your security when you su	rf/use the Internet?
Yes, I think about it all the time	I think about it from time to time
Yes, primarily when someone expects some	No, I do not think about it at all
action/reaction from me	



7. The effects of cybercrime

i. Should consumer rights organizations in any	country or region (e.g., the European BEUC, Bureau
Européen des Unions de Consommateurs, or N	National Data Protection Authorities DPA's, similar to the
Federal Trade Commission, FTC in the USA), I	be given enhanced powers to sanction heavier legal &
financial penalties, when poor security measure	es result in data breaches or cybercriminal events?
Yes	O No
Other (please specify)	
ii. What sources of cybercrime information do y	ou trust most?
National news services	Anti-virus / commercial vendors
O International news sources	Social media e.g via Twitter, Facebook, google+
Government information sources	Academic papers / conference proceedings
CERT vulnerability & threat advisories	Web articles and blogs
Other (please specify)	



8. Cyber Security Management

i. Do you feel responsib	ole for your ov	vn security on t	he Internet?			
Yes, it is entirely my re	sponsibility		No, it is	of little concern		
Yes, I feel very respons	sible		O No, I do	not feel responsi	ble at all	
Yes, I feel partly respon	nsible					
ii. Who in your opinion is be selected. Internet service and co Operators) Government agencies International Internet of Search Engine or web Yahoo, Microsoft System providers; e.g. Other (please specify)	For security on the Internet? More than 1 choice can Police IT and security departments in companies CERTS End users					
iii. To improve cyber se	curity ROI (R	eturn On Inves	tment) where	e should mone	y be spent in	the future?
	Top ROI	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Bottom ROI
Cybercrime definitions and classifications	0	\circ	0	0	0	\circ
Education in cybercrime prevention	0	0	0	0	0	0
Risks & effects of cybercrime	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyber security management	0	\circ	0	0	\circ	\circ
Economic impact of cybercrime	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laws and policies on cybercrime	\bigcirc	0	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\circ

practice according to Survey 1 respondents. Do you	think information sharing is?
A waste of time	Useful to others but I don't know who to share this with
Unnecessary	Useful to others but it is too time consuming/complicated
Useful to others but I don't trust another entity with the	O Potentially damaging for me/my organization to report this
information	information
v. Would you share information about cybercrime ev	vents/attack with any of the following?
Internet service and content providers	Private specialists - large company
Government	Private specialists - small company
Police	Not for profits
IT and security departments in companies	End users
CERTs	No one - this information doesn't need to be shared
Independent groups	
Please expand your answer if needed	
vi. Do you think that free software covers all your se you spend more on your online security, if finance w	ecurity needs, the needs of your organisation, or would were not an issue?
Yes I would spend more if I could	Free open source software fulfils my organisation's needs
No I do not need to spend more	Free open source software does not fulfil my personal
Free open source software fulfils my personal security	security needs
needs	Free open source software does not fulfil my organisation's needs
vii. Do you think money is currently being invested in	nto the right technologies to fight cybercrime?
Yes	O No
Please expand on your answer here if needed	



9. Economic impact of cybercrime

i. What do you think the estimated spend (in US Dolla 2015?	ars) will be on information security worldwide in
20 - 35 billion	80 - 95 billion
35 - 50 billion	95 - 110 billion
50 - 65 billion	110+ billion
65 - 80 billion	
ii. Half of respondents had 'no idea' what the cost of or the world. Is this because?	cybercrime is to either the economy of their country
It is not important to know how much it costs the economy	It is too large a scale to comprehend
I am only interested in how cybercrime affects me	The cost of cybercrime is too complex to measure
personally	accurately
I don't believe the figures in the news	
iii. Respondents view education of end-users as very education?	important. Who should be responsible for their
Individual end-users	Service providers
Government	System providers
CERTS	Schools/colleges
Other (please specify)	



10. Research into cybercrime

authority in response to a court order or warrant.

i. There are opposing views on encryption, which do you think is most valid? (1) One of the major methods for fighting cybercrime & improved privacy is better encryption of data and communications. (2) "Encrypted communications are becoming perhaps the biggest problem for the police and the security service authorities in dealing with the threats from terrorism" & "Concerned at moves by companies such as Apple to allow customers to encrypt data on their smartphones." - (Europol's chief, and other governmental agencies) (a) better and more encryption of data and communications (b) less encryption of data and communications (c) a balance is appropriate, for some level of encryption, but provide police and security service authorities the ability to deencrypt any data or communications (d) Not sure ii. If you selected (b), (c) or (d) for question 10. ii., which of the following do you think is acceptable? Only my national police or security service authority can intercept and / or decrypt my online data or communications when dealing with threats from terrorism Any police or security service authority internationally can intercept and / or decrypt my online data or communications when dealing with threats from terrorism Interception or decryption of my personal online data or communications, can only be carried out by police or security service

There should be no interception or decryption of my or others' personal online data or communications



11. Next steps

The following information	ation is optional. If you're happ	by to give us your contact information we will inform you
of the overall survey	results. Your personal details v	will not be used for any other purpose. Thank you for
participating.		
Name		
Company		
Email Address		

THE DELPHI PROCESS IN PRACTICE



	Survey 1	Survey 1 - English	Survey # 2	Rank	Survey # 2	Rank	Survey #3	Survey #3	Survey#3	Rank
Questions	In which country do you currently	respondents from 42 countries (890)	Technical In which country are you based?	1 to 5	Organizational In which country are you based?	1 to 5	Social In which country are you based?	Economic In which country are you based?	Political In which country are you based?	1 to 5
2	reside? Repeat	18 b 24 46% 25 b 34 31.0% 35 b 54 53.5% 55 b 64 9.0%	in which country are you based?	5	in which country are you based?	5	in which country are you based?	in which country are you based?	in which country are you based?	5
3	Where is the main business of your	65 + 1.9% respondents from 42 countries								
4	company?	1-5								
5	organisation type? Repeat	Scholarly research Policy making, Govt, legal or law enforcement 10.1% Cyber security practitioner, cyber security expert (any 14.7% thernet service provider or operator 6.0% Consumer group or end-user 1.8% Commercial business 14.5% Other (please specify) 20.7%	Which organizational category most closely fits you? <triad></triad>	5	Which organizational category most closely fits you? <triad></triad>	5	Which organizational category most closely fits you? < Triad>	Which organizational category most closely fits you? <triad></triad>	Which organizational category most closely fits you? <triad></triad>	5
	Definition of cybercrime									
6	For me cybercrime is	The use of a computer system(s) to enable traditional form of criminal activity with the system of the use of a computer system(s) to enable traditional form of criminal activity with the use of a computer date and systems. Any act agents the confidentialty, integrity end develoably of computer date and systems. That using a computer or Internet Any criminal act or hadring at computers and networks. Any litegal activity that uses a computer for the strange of evidence. Criminal activity carried out by means of computers or the Internet.	Top 3 from survey # 1 = pick best one: -Criminal activity carried out by means of computers or the Internet - Any criminal act or hacking of computers and networks - Any act against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems	5	cgraded response> spam phishing speer phishing copyright infringement (e.g. Megaupload) DoS Interception of private communications counterfiet goods online online fake pharmacy child pornography Blackhat SEO hacking into server or data operations cybersex data breach cyber squatting hacking websites for defacement cyber bullying Bullet proof hosting cuse comment box> Others?	5	Survey 1 respondents had no clear preference towards any one definition of cybercrime. How important do you think it is to achieve an internationally recognised definition? • Extremely • Important but not essential • Not very important • Not at all important • Comment box maximim 140 charachters: what would be your definition?		cgraded response> spam phishing speer phishing copyright infringement (e.g. Megaupload) Interception of private communications counterfiet goods online online fake pharmacy child pornography Blackhat SEO hacking into server or data operations cybersex data breach cyber sputting hacking websites for defacement cyber bullying Bullet proof hosting cuse comment bax> Others?	5
	Taxonomy						The development of a taxonomy (define) is an essential infrastructure to scientific research and other fields of study, helping with communications, publishing of results, metrics, ranking for funding, etc. How important is the building of a recognised taxonomy to the study of cybercrime? • Extremely • Important but not essential • Not very important • Not at all important			4
7	Cybercrime concerns									
	Are you concerned about cybercrime?	Extremely concerned 24.3% Very concerned 31.5% Mode rately concerned 32.1% Slightly concerned 8.8% Notatall concerned 33%					Do you believe any form of cybercrime is socially acceptable? Yes/No - If yes what ?		Do you believe cyber espionage is a real problem? 1-a matter of national security - 2-e exaggerated 3-political propaganda, 4- legitmate form of intelligence gathering	3
8	ls cybercrime a concern for your organisation?	Extremely concerned 22.3%					Established cybercriminal modus operandi are influencing the landscape of serious and organised crime, according to a recent report from Europol. Do you think that cybercrime is now a bigger risk than 'conventional' crime? • Yes • No • It's becoming increasingly difficult to separate cybercrime and conventional crime	What do you think the estimated spend (in US Dollars) will be on information security in 2015? 20 - 35 billion 35 - 50 billion 50 - 65 billion 65 - 80 billion 95 - 110 billion 110+ billion		3
9	Over the next 5 years do you think cybercrime will?	Increase 91.5% Decrease 1.8% Stay at the same level 6.7%								

	What does cybercrime mean to you							
10	Do you think cybercrime is?	Here to stary 57.5% Solvable 3.8% Containable 37.7% Not much of an issue 1.0%						
11	Do you see cybercrime as a problem rooted in?	Business strategy Society Education Technology 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50			<research gap?=""> Is it possible to determine the root causes of cybercrime ?</research>	Do you believe that cybercrime is mainly	Who in your opinion is responsible for security on the Internet (pick 3) * Internet service and content providers * the Police (and government in general) * IT and security departments in companies * CERTS * the end user * others	5
	Targets of cybercrime	i In year organisotien, which do you think is most likely to be the begat for cyberefrinksis?						
12	In your organisation, which do you think is most likely to be the target for cybercriminals?	So Out. So		Most repondents indicated "personal data" as the most likely target for cybercriminals in their organization. Should personal data be separated from the workplace?	Have we lost control of our personal data online? • Yes • No • It's time to take control back • It's not important if control is lost			
	What risks are you exposed to							
13	Does your organisation (or do you) apply risk management as part of a cyber security strategy?	Yes 54.0% No 20.7% Don't know 25.3%						
14	Does someone in the company (or do you) formally and regularly keep up-to-date with cybercrime related news via?	Generic newspapers and news broadcaster 17,2%		Do you feel you share responsibility for the IT security of your company? • Yes, I feel I share responsibility • I only share a small responsibility • No, I do not share responsibility	Do you think about your security when you surf/use the Internet? • Yes, I think about it all the time • Yes, primarily when someone expects some action/reaction from me • I think about it from time to time • No, I do not think about it at all			
15	How often are staff given training about cyber security risks?	Weekly 56% Monthly 85% Yearly 22.7% Never 16.5% Ohy if there is a problem 25.6% Don't know 21.1%	Do you hold certificates in, or attended, technical security training in any of the following areas: Information Security (general) -Cyber security for IT Administrators -Mitigation Strategies -Advanced Security -Incident prevention -Secure coding -Defending web applications -Digital forensics -Incident forensics -Incident forensics -Incident forensics -Cyber Threat intelligence -CISSP (Certified Information Systems Security Professional) -Security audits -Data security law -Industrial control incident response -Compliance -Hosting - Securing Information Systems Other (Specify)			Respondents indicate a low level of training on cybersecurity within the workplace. Who should be responsible for the cost of training? • Governments • Organization • school / collage add to syllabus	Should organizations require members of staff to hold a current license or qualification in use of the Internet & cybercrime preventions?	
16	Does your organisation allow the use of Bring Your Own Devices (BYOD)?	Yes 65.6% No 34.4%	Survey 1 indicates BYOD is now common within the workplace but rates of best practices/guidance on safe use are low. How highly do you rate this as a potential security risk? • Very high • Medium • Low					

		<u> </u>	1					
17		Yes 28.3%						
	Does your organisation have a best	Yes 28.3% No 41.6%	Do you think that there is a need for BYOD security					
		Don't know 30.2%	policies to be introduced in every organisation?					
				Many respondents indicated a general lack				
				of formal policies on cybersecurity management in their place of work. Why				
				do you think this is?				
				Insufficient awareness within executive				
				management				
				Insufficient resources to prepare the				
				documents				
				 Insufficient knowledge to prepare the 				
				documents				
				• There is no need for such policies				
			How effective do you think benchmarking and best	Other (specify)				
			practices could be in raising performance and					
			developing trust?					
			i) Extremely					
			ii) Very					
1			iii) Slightly					
			iv) Not at all					
			Other (specify)					
							For most respondents staff training in	
			For most respondents staff training in cybersecurity				cybersecurity only takes place when there	
			only takes place when there is a problem or, at best,				is a problem or, at best, once a year. Why	
			once a year. Why do you think this is?				do you think this is?	
1			There is no need to give regular security training to				There is no need to give regular security	
			all staff				training to all staff	
			Only specific staff i.e., those in a technical				Only specific staff i.e., those in a technical environment, need regular	
			environment, need regular training				training	
			Perceived low effectiveness of training				Perceived low effectiveness of training	
			Lack of awareness in executive management				Lack of awareness in executive	
			Lack of knowledge in the subject Lack of time/human resources				management	
			Cost too high				Lack of knowledge in the subject	
			• Cost too nign				 Lack of time/human resources 	
							Cost too high	
	The effects of cybercrime							
18	-							
		i. Have you experienced a cybercriminal action in the last 5 years in a?				Give an example of the cybercriminal		
		t. Have you asperienced a cycle chimina action in the last 3 years in a				activity you personally encountered in		
		50.04				your company or in your private life.		
		50.0%				Phishing Spam		
		40.0%				Rogueware/Ransomware/Scareware		
		35.0%				Data Breaches (Compromising		
	Have you experienced a cybercriminal	30.0%				Confidential Information)		
	action in the last 5 years in a?	20.0%				Information leakage		
		15.0%				Targeted Attack		
		10.0%				Botnet		
		5.0%				Worm/Trojan		
		Personal capacity Through work Never				Drive-by exploit		
			- <mark>-</mark>			Code injection Country to the code injection		
1						• Exploit Kit • DNS manipulation		
						- 545 manipulation		
							Missions of automotion advantage at the	
		Loss of money 14.1%					Victims of cybercrime describe the two largest effects were: "down time" &	
l		Down time 29.8%					"inconvenience" - What would you	
1	If you have been a victim of	Inconvenience 46.8%					estimate the time lost was:	
19	cybercrime in the last 5 years, what	Psychologically harmful 10.5%					< 4 hours	
	was the effect of the action?	Loss of reputation 10.5%					5 - 8 hours	
		No effect 33.3%					9 - 24 hours	
							25 hours +	
			 					
	As a direct result of a cybercriminal	Yes 44.7%						
20		No 12.4% Don't know 15.7%						
1	make any changes to the cyber security strategy?	N/A 15.7% N/A 27.2%						
	security strategy:	27.276	<u> </u>					
	If you have experienced a cyber attack,	Yes 41.0%						
1								
21	do you think it posed a systemic risk to	20.576						
21	do you think it posed a systemic risk to you or your organisation?	Don't know 30.1%	J <mark>.</mark>		<u> </u>			

22	If you have been a victim of cybercrime, what action followed?	Reported to the police with no further action Reported to the police, who contacted me /my Reported to the police, who followed it through but no Reported to the police, who followed it through to Not reported to police Didn't know how to report to the police Other	8.1% 6.3% 8.8% 7.2% 36.6% 5.8% 27.3%		Survey 1 showed that most victims of cybercrime never reported their case to the Police. Why do you think that is?	Do you believe that realistically expected penalties for cybercrime are: • Too low • Adequate • Too high			
23	If you have been a victim of cybercrime, did you contact your national or government CERT for assistance?	Reported to national or government CERT, with no Reported to national or government CERT, with action Did not contact CERT but I know the police did Did not contact my national or government CERT Did not know I could report to a CERT Do not know what a CERT is or how to contact them	8.7% 10.9% 6.2% 28.6% 16.9% 28.6%		Survey 1 indicates awareness of CERTs (National Computer Emergency Response Team's) is very low. How can this be improved?				
	Security management								
24	Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices?	Firewalls Antivirus Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker,&ecure em all gateway Data encryption Early warning system VOIP encryption Password manager VPN Hash generator Back-up system (cloud or onsite)	85.3% 86.8% 34.4% 62.7% 51.1% 8.9% 11.0% 48.2% 51.0% 65.8%	Survey 1 indicates that the security strategy for the majority heavily relies on firewalls and antivirus while proactive tools (eg. EWS, VoIP encryption, DLP) have low rates of adoption. Why do you think this is? • Cost of such tools is too high • Lack of knowledge of such tools • Difficulty in choosing the right tools • Mindsets need to change about proactive security • Other (please specify)		Do you feel responsible for your own security on the Internet? • Yes, it is entirely my responsibility • Yes, I feel very responsible • Yes, I feel partly responsible • No, it is of little concern • No, I do not feel responsible at all		Who in your opinion is, or should be, responsible for security on the Internet * Internet service and content providers * Government * Police * IT and security departments in companies * CERTS * End users * Others (Specify)	
25	Which of the following security applications does your organisation use?	Firewalls Antivirus Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker.éscure em ail gateway Data encryption Eafly warning system VOIP encryption Password manager Hash generator VPN Dedicated resources SIEM (Security information and event management) Back-up system (cloud or onsite) IDS:/P'S solution DLP solution Other (please specify)	95.2% 93.2% 53.7% 77.4% 54.2% 19.1% 16.8% 41.9% 12.3% 60.1% 24.3% 66.4% 36.3% 10.6% 42%	Identity theft accounted for more than half the total of all attacks in 2014. Data needs to be secured both inside & outside the network. How is the flow of data managed in your organisation? • I'm not aware that the data flow is managed • Data is limited (contained) to certain places • The number of people with access to data is controlled • Users are authenticated • Sensitive data is encrypted for internal movement • Sensitive data is encrypted for external movement • Encryption keys are securely stored			What investment in security should be made to return the greatest improvements at the lowest possible cost?		
26	How is your own/your organisation's cyber security managed?	In-house by someone who is in charge of (security) In-house CERT I manage my own cyber security Outsourced to a independent specialist or By the Internet Service Provider Don't know	50.8% 12.5% 11.9% 4.7% 1.9% 18.2%	Social engineering is the most common form of attack on personal data, mainly via phishing and spear phishing. How highly do you rate your ability to thwart an attempt at phishing? • Very high - I don't think I wouldn get caught out • high - I'm confident I would catch most phishing attempts • Moderate - I'm aware of what it is but I can't be sure I would spot it every time • Not at all sure • I don't know what spear phishing is					
27				Does your organisation have an escalation route		Sharing of information with outside entities is not common practice. Do you think information sharing is? • Unnecessary • A waste of time		Would you share information about cyber events/attack with any of the following? • Internet service and content providers • Government • Police • IT and security departments in	
	Do you, or does someone else in your organisation, share information about cyber events/attacks with an outside organisation?		35.4% 24.8% 39.8%	Do you think there is a lack of tools for sharing information about cyber events/attacks with an outside organization?		Useful to others but I don't trust another entity with the information Useful to others but I don't know who to share this with Useful to others but it is too time consuming/complicated Potentially damaging for me/my organization to report this information		companies - CERTs - Independent groups - Private specialists - large company - Private specialists - small company - Not for profits - End users - No one - this information doesn't need to be shared - Others (Specify)	

7.4%

6.8%

9.2%

10.2%

26.2%

How much does your organisation

spend annually on cyber security

oroducts?

32

101 -500

10,000+

501 - 1,000

1,000 - 10,000

WP5

nvested into the right technologies to

The investment may be right but not

enough of these technologies are being

fight cybercrime?

Yes

No

+			If a system of financial penalties were to be imposed due to poor security measures resulting in data breaches or cybercriminal events, what should the money collected be used for? i) To fund the activities of the DPA's or other independent bodies ii) The public purse iii) Compensation for victims iv) Other (specify)
Trust	What sources of cybercrime data do you trust most, please provide a 'trust factor' range 1-5 (1= low trust factor 5= highest): - Security news articles - Cyber security bloggers - Government advisories - Academic papers / conference proceedings - Black / block lists - Social media e.g via Twitter, Facebook, google+ Your own discoveries e.g. log files, infections, & incidents - Anti-virus vendors - Cert vulnerability & threat advisories - Cyber security associations e.g Owasp, APWG, Maawg Others (please state)		What sources of cybercrime information do (we) you trust most, please provide a 'trust factor' - range 1-5 (1= low trust factor 5= highest): - National news services - International news sources - Government information sources - Government information sources - CERT vulenrability & threat advisories - Anti-virus / Commercial vendors - Social media e.g via Twitter, Facebook, google+ Academic papers / conference proceedings - Web articles - Others (please state)

SURVEY #1 WHOLE TO POLAND COMPARISON



	Survey 1	Survey 1 - English		Survey 1 - Polish	
#	Questions				
1	In which country do you currently reside?	respondents from 42 countries (890)		respondents 97% from Poland (359)	
2	What is your age?	18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 54 55 to 64 65 +	4.6% 31.0% 53.5% 9.0% 1.9%	od 18do 24 od 25do 34 od 35do 54 od 55do 64 od 65+	30.7% 42.3% 25.9% 0.9% 0.3%
3	Where is the main business of your company located	respondents from 42 countries		respondents 87.3% from Poland	
4	How many employees work for your company?	1-5 6-20 21-100 101-500 501-1000 1000+	11.1% 9.3% 16.4% 21.0% 11.8% 30.4%	1-5 6-20 21-100 101-500 501-1000 1000+	21.7% 7.2% 18.7% 16.6% 5.1% 30.7%
5	Which category most closely fits your organisation type?	Scholarly research Policy making, Govt, legal or law enforcement Cyber security practitioner, cyber security expert (any Internet service provider or operator Consumer group or end-user Commercial business Other (please specify)	32.3% 10.1% 14.7% 6.0% 1.8% 14.5% 20.7%	uczelnia, instytut badawczy administracja rządowa, organy legislacyjne, praktyk lub ekspert bezpieczeństwa komputerowego dostawca Internetu, operator sieci grupa konsumencka, użytkownik końcowy, osoba instytucja komercyjna inne (proszę uszczegółowić)	10.8% 12.5% 8.1% 8.4% 12.8% 35.5% 11.9%
	Definition of cybercrime				
6	For me cybercrime is	The use of a computer system(s) to enable traditional form of criminal activity and the use. Any act against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems Theft using a computer or Internet Any criminal act or hacking of computers and networks Any illegal activity that uses a computer for the storage of evidence Criminal activity carried out by means of computers or the Internet	2.00 3.00	Dłamnie cyberprzestępczość to Zadne z powyższych Użycie komputera/systemów komputerowych do tradycyjnych form przestępczości i użycie. Każ da działalność przestępcza i danych Kradzież z użyciem komputera/Internetu Każ da działalność przestępcza związana z włamywaniem się do komputera i sieci Każ da nielegalna działalność kórej ślady mogą pozostać na komputerze Działalność przestępczą wykonywaną z a pośrednictwem komputera/Internetu 0.00 1.00	2.00 3.00
	Cybercrime concerns				
7	Are you concerned about cybercrime?	Extremely concerned Very concerned Moderately concerned Slightly concerned Notatall concerned	24.3% 31.5% 32.1% 8.8% 3.3%	Bardzo mocno Mocno Średnio Tylko troche W ogóle sie nie przejmuje	26.4% 49.5% 17.3% 5.4% 1.4%
8	Is cybercrime a concern for your organisation?	Extremely concerned Very concerned Moderately concerned Slightly concerned Not at all concerned	22.3% 27.9% 33.8% 12.8% 3.2%	Bardzo dużym problemem Dużym problemem Średnim problemem Niewielkim problemem W ogóle nie jest problemem	10.5% 22.6% 27.1% 26.7% 13.2%

9	Over the next 5 years do you think cybercrime will? What does cybercrime mean to you	Increase Decrease Stay at the same level	91.5% 1.8% 6.7%	Zwiekszy się Zmniejszy się Pozostanie na tymsamym poziomie	95.6% 0.4% 4.0%
10	Do you think cybercrime is?	Here to stay Solva ble Conta inable Not much of an issue	57.5% 3.8% 37.7% 1.0%	jest zjawiskiem, które zawsze bedzie obecne jest problemem, który zostanie rozwiązany jest problemem, który można ograniczyć nie jest żadnym problemem	75.0% 0.8% 24.2% 0.0%
11	Do you see cybercrime as a problem rooted in?	Business strategy Society Education Technology 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00	3.50 4.00 4.50	ii. Czy uważasz, że cyberprzestępczość to problem, którego źródkoprzyczna interesach ekonomicznych polityce strategii biznesowej społeczeństwie edukacji technologii 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00	a twiqw?
	Targets of cybercrime				
12	In your organisation, which do you think is most likely to be the target for cybercriminals?	i. In your organisation, which do you think is most likely to be the cybercriminals? Cloud infrastructures Personal data Personal data Personal data Cloud infrastructures Payment systems Payment systems Payment systems On-Line san/coss/Web. Online san/coss/Web. Online san/coss/Web. Coloud infrastructures Payment systems On-Line san/coss/Web. Coloud infrastructures On-Line san/coss/Web. Online san/coss/Web. Online san/coss/Web. People (critzens)		i. Które elementy w Twojej organizacji uważasz za najbardziej prawdopodobny cel dla cyberprzestępośw? krytyczna dane osopowe dane osopowe systemy płatności nuządzenia usługi on- uządzenia nuządzenia partowa pankowe telej nuządzenia krytyczna (odjistyka i nuządzenia krytyczna partowa pankowatelej nudzie (obywatelej nudzie (obywatelej nudzie procesu przez prz	stacje robocze- komunikacja z
	What risks are you exposed to				
13	Does your organisation (or do you) apply risk management as part of a cyber security strategy?	Yes No Don't know	54.0% 20.7% 25.3%	tak nie nie wiem	52.9% 25.0% 22.1%
14	Does someone in the company (or do you) formally and regularly keep up-to-date with cybercrime related news via?	Generic newspapers and news broadcaster Specialized news sources Consulting companies Activities outsourced to external company/ies Social network contacts No time allocated to do this	17.2% 46.1% 5.2% 5.6% 7.9% 18.0%	ogólnotematycznych gazet i serwisów informacyjnych specjalistycznych źródeł wiadomości firm konsultingowych czynności prowadzonych przez zewnętrzne firmy w sieci społ ecznościowych nie alokuje na to czasu	20.1% 61.9% 1.3% 2.5% 7.1%

15	How often are staff given training about cyber security risks?	Weekly Monthly Yearly Never Only if there is a problem Don't know	5.6% 8.5% 22.7% 16.5% 25.6% 21.1%	co tydzień co miesiac co rok nigdy tylko wtedy, gdy wystąpi problem nie wiem	3.4% 3.4% 20.1% 24.8% 23.5% 24.8%
16	Does your organisation allow the use of Bring Your Own Devices (BYOD)?	Yes No	65.6% 34.4%	tak nie	54.3% 45.7%
17	Does your organisation have a best practices policy for BYOD?	Yes No Don't know	28.3% 41.6% 30.2%	tak nie nie wiem	34.5% 51.1% 14.5%
	The effects of cybercrime				
18	Have you experienced a cybercriminal action in the last 5 years in a?	i. Have you experienced a cybercriminal action in the last 5 years 50.0% 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% Personal capacity Through work	s in a?	i. Czy doświadczyłeś/doświadczyłeś działań cyberprostatnich 5 lat? 50.0% 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 0.0% w życiu osobistym w pracy	zestępczych w ciągu
19	If you have been a victim of cybercrime in the last 5 years, what was the effect of the action?	Loss of money Down time Inconvenience Psychologically harmful Loss of reputation No effect	14.1% 29.8% 46.8% 10.5% 10.5% 33.3%	strata pieniedzy wstrzymanie pracy niedogodność obciążenie psychiczne utrata dobrego imienia zaden	13.8% 20.5% 41.0% 22.6% 10.8% 42.6%
20	As a direct result of a cybercriminal attack or threat, did you/your work make any changes to the cyber security strategy?	Yes No Don't know N/A	44.7% 12.4% 15.7% 27.2%	tak nie nie wiem nie dotyczy	34.7% 19.2% 13.2% 32.9%
21	If you have experienced a cyber attack, do you think it posed a systemic risk to you or your organisation?	Yes No Don't know	41.0% 28.9% 30.1%	tak nie nie wiem	53.3% 21.6% 25.1%

Type have been a wich or fleposted to the police with controlled die. My 12 to 20 to		Ŷ	T			
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22 synu have been a victim of ophercrime, what action followed? Did not control to police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not how how to report to the police Did not be reported to relational or government CERT with action Did not control CERT but flow who he police Did not Did not control CERT but flow who have to Did not be reported Did not Did not Did not be reported Did not Did not be reported Did not D			Reported to the police, who contacted me imy	6.3%	zgłos zono spra wę na policję, która skontaktowała	3.5%
A to the ported to police Security management			Reported to the police, who followed it through but no	8.8%	zgłos zono sprawę na policję, która poprowadził a ją,	14.0%
A to the ported to police Security management		If you have been a victim of		72%	zgłos zono sprawe na policie, która poprowadził a ja	5.3%
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ryou have been a victim of operating, did you contact your assistance? Provided the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation applications does your organisation applicatio						
poterraine, dd you contact your national or government CERT or power of government CERT for assistance? Did not nonator CERT for Did not knowl could report b a CERT Did not	1		Reported to national or government CERT, with no	8.7%	zgł oszono sprawę do rządowego lub narodowego	7.7%
potercime, did you contact your national or government CERT or power of power or power of the contact the management CERT or assistance? Security management		If you have been a victim of	Reported to national or government CERT, with action	10.9%	zgł oszono sprawę do rządowego lub narodowego	7.7%
asistance? Did not correct my national or government CERT point was careful to six factors as the control of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Frewalls Arrivins 88.8% arrivins 88.8% arrivins 98.9% your own your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does you			Did not contact CERT but I know the police did	6.2%	nie zgłoszono sprawy do CERT, ale wiem, że policja	3.2%
Digital not know what a CERT is or how to contact them 28.6%	23	1 ' ' '	Did not contact my national or government CERT	28.6%	nie zgłoszono sprawy do CERT ponieważ uznano to	30.3%
Security management Firewalls Artivirus Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Firewalls Artivirus Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Firewalls Artivirus Spam blocker/accure em all gateway power computing devices? Firewalls Artivirus Spam blocker/accure em all gateway power computing devices? Firewalls Artivirus Firewalls Artivirus Spam blocker/accure em all gateway PVN Firewalls Artivirus Spam blocker/accure em all gateway PVN Firewalls Artivirus Spam blocker/accure em all gateway PVN Firewalls Firewalls Artivirus Spam blocker/accure em all gateway PVN Spam blo		•	Did not knowl could report to a CERT	16.9%		
Pre-walls		assistance?				
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Vulnerability scanning 24 Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Password manager Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Password manager Which of the following security which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Firewalls Antivitus Password manager Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Firewalls Antivitus Password manager Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system VPN Dedicated resources Which of the following security Applications does your organisation use? Elimental Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gateway Data encryption Early warning system Spam blocker/secure email gatew	i					
Which of the following security applications do you use on your own computing devices? Spam blocker/secure em all gateway 5.11% applications do you use on your own computing devices? VOIP encryption 11.0% VOIP encryption 11.0% assword manager 48.2% aryfrowenie darnych 12.9% VPN 51.0% emenadzer has ell aryfrowenie darnych 10.0% generator has hy assword manager 48.8% aryfrowenie darnych 10.0% generator has hy assword manager 48.8% aryfrowenie darnych 10.0% generator has hy assword with the following security 3.3% Vulnerability scanning 5.3% Vulnerability s						
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24 applications do you use on your own computing devices? Early warning system you've applications do you use on your own computing devices? VPN						
Applications do you seed in your own computing devices? VPI Password manager VPI Passw		Which of the following security				
computing devices? VOIP encryption Password manager Pasw	24	applications do you use on your own		8.9%	systemy wczesnego ostrzegania	12.9%
Password manager VPN Hash generator Back-up system (cloud or onsite) Firewalls Antivius Vulnerability scanning Spam blocker-fecure email gateway Spam blocked in the wall sarphware all spam spam us page antywirusy Spam blocked in the wall sarphware all spam spam us page antywirusy Spam blocked in the wall sarphware			VOIP encryption	11.0%	VPN	54.1%
Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Firewalls applications does your organisation users applied the your applications does your organisation users applications does your organisation users applications does your organisation users a		computing devices:	Password manager	48.2%	szyfro wanie VOIP	7.7%
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Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? It as the generator has by generator has by dedykowane zas oby VPN SIEM (Security information and event management) 24.3% SIEM (Security information and event management) 25.1% system kepi zapasowej (w chmurze lub lokalnie) 68.3% system y IDS /IPS (wykrywanie intruzów) 45.7% system y IDS /IPS (wykrywanie intruzów) 19.1% other (please specify) 4.5% In-house by someone who is in charge of (security) 19.1% inne –jakie? Wewmetrznie, przez osoby od powiedzialne za polityki 55.6% wł asmy CERT 10.2% sam/sama zarzadzam cyberbezpieczeństwem 16.1% przez odusourcing do niezależnego specialisty lub przez dostawce Internetu (ISP) 29%			Data encryption	54.2%	szyfro wanie danych	63.8%
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Which of the following security applications does your organisation use? Password manager Hash generator 12.3% VPN Dedicated resources 5EM (Security information and event management) 24.3% SIEM (Security information and event management) 24.3% SIEM (Security information and event management) 22.1% SIEM (Security information and event mana				16.8%		15.6%
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VPN Dedicated resources SIEM (Security information and event management) Back-up system (cloud or onsite) Back-up system (cloud or o	25	applications does your organisation	_			
SIEM (Security information and event management) Back-up system (cloud or onsite) Back-up system (c		use?				
Back-up system (cloud or onsite) Back-u						
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DLP solution Other (please specify) In-house by someone who is in charge of (security) systemy DLP (o chrona przed wyciekiem danych) inne -jakie? Wewmetrznie, przez oso by od powiedzialne za polityki syber security managed? Wewmetrznie, przez oso by od powiedzialne za polityki samy CERT I manage my own cyber security Outsourced to a independent specialist or By the Internet Service Provider DLP solution 10.6% 4.5% Wewmetrznie, przez oso by od powiedzialne za polityki samy CERT sam/sama zarządzam cyberbezpieczeństwem przez outsourcing do niezależnego specjalisty lub przez dostawce Internetu (ISP) 29%			,			
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How is your own/your organisation's cyber security managed? In-house CERT 12.5% wf asny CERT sam/sama zarzadzam cyberbezpieczeństwem przez outsourcing do niezależnego specjalisty lub przez dostawce Internet (ISP) 29%						
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cyber security managed? I manage my own cyber security Outsourced to a independent specialist or By the Internet Service Provider I manage my own cyber security 11.9% sam/sama zarzadzam cyberbezpieczeństwem przez outsourcing do niezależnego specialisty lub przez dostawce Internet (ISP) 20% 29%		How is your own/your organisation's	In-house CERT	12.5%	whasny CERT	10.2%
Outsourced to a independent specialist or 4.7% przez outsourcing do niezależnego specialisty lub przez dostawce Internet (ISP) 29%	26	, , ,	I manage my own cyber security	11.9%	sam/sama zarządzam cyberbezpieczeństwem	16.1%
By the Internet Service Provider 1.9% przez dostawce Internetu (ISP) 2.9%		o, see seeding managea.				
Tile Wieffi 13.2%	i					
	i		DOTT NIOW	10.270	THE WIETT	13.270

27		Yes	35.4%	tak	21.1%
	Do you, or does someone else in your	No	24.8%	nie	45.6%
	The state of the s			120120	
	organisation, share information about	Don't know	39.8%	nie wiem	33.3%
	cyber events/attacks with an outside				
	organisation?				
				<u>- </u>	
		Yes	21.4%	tak	22.1%
	Do you/your organisation hold	No	33.2%	nie	43.1%
		Don't know	45.4%	nie wiem	34.8%
28	any Information Security Management	DOTTRION	40.470	nie wiem	34.076
	certificates, e.g., ISO 27001?				
		Penetration testing	16.1%	testy penetracyjne	21.7%
		Vulnerability testing	11.8%	testy podatności	5.6%
	Do you/your organisation use the		16.4%		
29	following security testing techniques?	Audits		audyty	26.8%
	Tonowing security testing teeninques:	Other	5.0%	inne	6.6%
		Don't know	50.7%	nie wiem	39.4%
	Economic impact				
		US\$	12.7%	US\$	17.1%
		EURO	59.4%	EURO	81.8%
		GBP	3.0%	GBP	T18-02-10-5 (MCC) 44
		CHF	24.5%		1.1%
30	Currency			CHF	0.0%
		YEN	0.2%	YEN	0.0%
		CA\$	0.0%	CA\$	0.0%
		AU\$	0.2%	AU\$	0.0%
		O	47.0%	o	52.3%
		1-100	33.7%	1-100	35.7%
	annually on cyber security, e.g. anti-		8.7%	101 -250	9.0%
		101 -250			
	virus, anti-spam, upgrades, etc.?	250+	10.6%	250+	3.0%
				-	
		ō	7.4%	o	15.9%
		1-100	6.8%	1-100	8.5%
	How much does your organisation				
32	spend annually on cyber security	101 -500	9.2%	101 -500	11.4%
	products?	501 - 1,000	10.2%	501 - 1,000	9.1%
	products:	1,000 - 10,000	26.2%	1,000 - 10,000	23.9%
		10,000+	40.2%	10,000+	31.3%
		.,5,555	10.270		01.070
33		Up to 25 million	6.0%	do 25 milionów	6.6%
	What do you think is the cost of	26m - 100m	14.9%	26 mln - 100 mln	18.3%
			23.6%		
	cybercrime to the economy of your	100 million+		ponad 100 mln	26.9%
	country of residence per annum?	No idea	55.4%	nie mam pojecia	48.2%

D5.1

34	What do you think is the cost of cybercrime to the world economy?	Less than 1billion 1bn - 10bn 11bn - 25bn 26bn - 100bn Over 100 billion No idea	1.0% 6.8% 6.7% 14.7% 15.7% 55.2%	1 mld - 10 mld 3 11 mld - 25 mld 7 26 mld - 100 mld 11 ponad 100 mld 26	.0% .5% .0% 1.1% 5.6%).8%
	Research				
35	To make the Internet a safer place and to fight cybercrime, what are the topics we should research into?		□Not Important ■Important ■Very important	150 Wa	ważne żne dzo ważne
36	Are you willing to participate in another and more advanced survey, to help develop the definitive research roadmap on cybercrime?	Yes No	50.3% 49.7%	TOTAL CONTRACTOR CONTR	3.5% 6.5%

SEARCHABLE DATABASE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)

http://cyberroad.eu/bibliography/

THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE



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D_{5.1} Stakeholder needs and threats evaluation

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D_{5.1} Stakeholder needs and threats evaluation

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